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No.
03-55785 D.C. No. CV-03-01267-AHM
OPINION
Appeal
from the United States District Court for the Central District of California A.
Howard Matz, District Judge, Presiding Argued and Submitted August 11, 2003 San
Francisco, California Filed December 18, 2003 Before: REINHARDT, GRABER, Circuit
Judges, and SHADUR, Senior District Judge. *
Opinion
by Judge Reinhardt.
I.
BACKGROUND
This
case presents the question whether the Executive Branch may hold uncharged
citizens of foreign nations in indefinite detention in territory under the
“complete jurisdiction and control” of the United States while effectively
denying them the right to challenge their detention in any tribunal anywhere,
including the courts of the U.S. The issues we are required to confront are new,
important, and difficult.
In
the wake of the devastating terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, Congress
authorized the President to use all necessary and appropriate force against
those nations, organizations, or persons he determines planned, authorized,
committed, or aided the terrorist attacks that occurred on September 11, 2001,
or harbored such organizations or persons, in order to prevent any future acts
of international terrorism against the United States by such nations,
organizations or persons.
Authorization
for Use of Military Force , Pub. L. No. 107-40, 115 Stat. 224 (2001).
Pursuant
to that authorization, the President sent U.S. forces to Afghanistan to wage a
military operation that has been commonly termed–but never formally
declared–a “war” against the Taliban government and the terrorist network
known as Al Queda.
Starting
in early January 2002, the Armed Forces began transferring to Guantanamo, a
United States naval base located on territory physically situated on the island
of Cuba,1 scores of individuals who were captured by
the American military during its operations in Afghanistan. The captured
individuals were labeled “enemy combatants.” Now, for almost two years, the
United States has subjected over six hundred of these captives to indefinite
detention,2 yet has failed to afford them any means
to challenge their confinement, to object to the failure to recognize them as
prisoners of war, to consult with legal counsel, or even to advance claims of
mistaken capture or identity. Despite U.S. officials’ recent stated intention
to move to begin a sorting of the detainees, electing which to release and which
to try before military tribunals on criminal charges, and the administration’s
designation several months ago of six detainees (including two Britons and one
Australian) deemed eligible for military trials, see Neil A. Lewis, Red
Cross Criticizes Indefinite Detention in Guantanamo, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 10,
2003, at A1, no military tribunal has actually been convened. Nor has a single
Guantanamo detainee been given the opportunity to consult an attorney, had
formal charges filed against him, or been permitted to contest the basis of his
detention in any way.
Moreover,
top U.S. officials, including Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld, have made it clear
that the detainees may be held in their present circumstances until this
country’s campaign against terrorism ends. Id. The administration has,
understandably, given no indication whether that event will take place in a
matter of months, years, or decades, if ever.3 On
January 20, 2002, a group of journalists, lawyers, professors, and members of
the clergy filed a petition for habeas relief before the United States District
Court for the Central District of California on behalf of the class of
unidentified individuals detained involuntarily at Guantanamo. The petition
named as respondents President Bush, Secretary Rumsfeld, and a number of
military personnel. See Coalition of Clergy v. Bush, 189 F. Supp. 2d 1036
(C.D. Cal. 2002).
After
the district court dismissed the petition for lack of “next-friend”
standing, or, alternatively, for lack of jurisdiction under Johnson v.
Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763 (1950), this court affirmed on the ground that
petitioners lacked standing, but vacated the court’s jurisdictional rulings
regarding Johnson. See Coalition of Clergy v. Bush, 310 F.3d 1153
(9th Cir. 2002).
Following
our decision, Belaid Gherebi filed an amended next-friend habeas petition in
this Court, on behalf of his brother Faren, in which the standing issue is not
present. In his February 2003 Amended Petition, Gherebi4
alleged violations of the U.S. Constitution and the Third Geneva Convention
arising out of his involuntary detention at Guantanamo, a naval base “under
the exclusive and complete jurisdiction of the respondents,” and he further
claimed that, “Respondents have characterized Gherebi as an ‘unlawful
combatant,’ and have denied him status as a prisoner of war, have denied him
rights under the United States Constitution,. . . have denied him access to the
United States Courts,” and have denied him access to legal counsel.5
The government did not respond.
Thereafter,
Gherebi urged this Court to resolve the “threshhold question” of federal
subject matter jurisdiction in a motion to grant his petition summarily.6
At that point, the government moved to dismiss Gherebi’s petition without
prejudice to its being re-filed in the district court, or alternatively, to
transfer it to the district court so that the district judge could decide the
question of jurisdiction. A motions panel of this Court granted the
government’s request, transferring Gherebi’s petition to the United States
District Court for the Central District of California.
After
additional motions were filed with the district court urging summary disposition
of the jurisdictional question, that court issued a reasoned order on May 13,
2003 dismissing Gherebi’s petition for lack of jurisdiction. See Gherebi v.
Bush,
No. CV 03-1267-AHM(JTL) (C.D. Cal. May 13, 2003) (order dismissing petition for
lack of jurisdiction). The court held that Johnson v. Eisentrager controlled
and foreclosed jurisdiction over Gherebi’s petition in any federal court
because Guantanamo “is not within sovereign U.S. territory.” Id. at
5. In so holding, the court described its conclusion as “reluctant[],” id.
at 2, and expressed hope that “a higher court w[ould] find a principled
way” to provide the remedy of habeas corpus. Id. at 15.
On
appeal before this Court, Gherebi argues that (1) the district court erred in
holding that Johnson v. Eisentrager precludes the district courts of this
nation from exercising jurisdiction over his petition; and (2) the District
Court for the Central District of California has jurisdiction to hear the writ
because the custodians of the prisoners are within the jurisdiction of the
court. We agree with Gherebi on both points. In so holding, we underscore that
the issue before us is not whether Gherebi’s detention will withstand
constitutional inquiry, but rather whether the courts of the United States are
entirely closed to detainees held at Guantanamo indefinitely–detainees who
would appear to have no effective right to seek relief in the courts of any
other nation or before any international judicial body.
We
recognize that the process due “enemy combatant” habeas petitioners may vary
with the circumstances and are fully aware of the unprecedented challenges that
affect the United States’ national security interests today, and we share the
desire of all Americans to ensure that the Executive enjoys the necessary power
and flexibility to prevent future terrorist attacks. However, even in times of
national emergency–indeed, particularly in such times–it is the obligation
of the Judicial Branch to ensure the preservation of our constitutional values
and to prevent the Executive Branch from running roughshod over the rights of
citizens and aliens alike. Here, we simply cannot accept the government’s
position that the Executive Branch possesses the unchecked authority to imprison
indefinitely any persons, foreign citizens included, on territory under the sole
jurisdiction and control of the United States, without permitting such prisoners
recourse of any kind to any judicial forum, or even access to counsel,
regardless of the length or manner of their confinement. We hold that no lawful
policy or precedent supports such a counter-intuitive and undemocratic
procedure, and that, contrary to the government’s contention, Johnson neither
requires nor authorizes it. In our view, the government’s position is
inconsistent with fundamental tenets of American jurisprudence and raises most
serious concerns under international law.7
Accordingly, we reverse the ruling of the district court that jurisdiction over
Gherebi’s habeas petition does not lie. Because we also conclude that personal
jurisdiction may be asserted against respondent Rumsfeld in the Central District
of California, we remand the matter to the district court for further
proceedings consistent with this opinion. We do not resolve here, and leave to
the district court to decide, the distinct and important question whether a
transfer to a different district court may be appropriate under 28 U.S.C. §
1404(a).
II.
DISCUSSION
A.
Johnson
v. Eisentrager as a bar to jurisdiction
To
support its contention that habeas jurisdiction does not lie with respect to the
Guantanamo detainees in the Central District or any other district court of the
United States, the government relies primarily on Johnson v. Eisentrager,
339 U.S. 763 (1950). Johnson involved a habeas petition by German enemy
prisoners detained in Landsberg Prison, Germany, after being tried and sentenced
to a fixed term of confinement by a U.S. Military Commission in Nanking, China
for offenses committed in China subsequent to the unconditional surrender of
Germany at the end of World War II. The Court declined to exercise jurisdiction,
holding that the German national petitioners, tried in China for acts committed
there, and confined to prison in Germany, had no right to seek a writ of habeas
corpus in a United States court to test the legality of such detention. Id. at
790.
In
connection with its holding, the Court discussed two factors: first, that the
prisoners were “alien enemies” in a declared war, see generally id. at
769-776 (discussing the significance of alien enemy status and the reach of
jurisdiction); and second, that the petitioners were detained outside “any
territory over the which the United States is sovereign, and the scenes of their
offense, their capture, their trial and their punishment were all beyond the
territorial jurisdiction of any court of the United States.” Id. at
777-78; see generally id. at 777-85 (discussing the significance of
extraterritorial situs, or situs outside U.S. sovereign territory, and the reach
of jurisdiction). The Court explained:
We
are cited to no instance where a court, in this or any other country where the
writ is known, has issued it on behalf of an alien enemy who, at no
relevant time and in no stage of his captivity, has been within its territorial
jurisdiction. Nothing in the text of the Constitution extends such a right,
nor does anything in our statutes.
399
U.S. at 768 (emphasis added). The Johnson Court did not suggest that the
mere “alien enemy” status of petitioners would be sufficient in itself for
the denial of habeas jurisdiction; rather it emphasized that in the case of
alien enemies habeas is not available when their acts and the situs of their
trial and detention all lie outside of this nation’s territorial jurisdiction.8
The government contends that the exercise of habeas jurisdiction over
Gherebi’s petition is foreclosed by Johnson because the conditions that
justified the Court’s decision there apply equally to Gherebi and the other
Guantanamo detainees. We may assume, for purposes of this appeal, that most, if
not all of those being held at Guantanamo, including Gherebi, are the equivalent
of “alien enemies,” indeed “enemy combatants,” although we do not
foreclose here Gherebi’s right to challenge the validity of that assumption
upon remand. The dispositive issue, for purposes of this appeal, as the
government acknowledges, relates to the legal status of Guantanamo, the site of
petitioner’s detention. It is our determination of that legal status that
resolves the question regarding the dispositive jurisdictional factor: whether
or not Gherebi is being detained within the territorial jurisdiction of the
United States or within its sovereign jurisdiction, as the case may be.
On
this appeal, the government does not dispute that if Gherebi is being detained
on U.S. territory, jurisdiction over his habeas petition will lie, whether or
not he is an “enemy alien.” In Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1(1942) and In
re Yamashita, 327 U.S. 1(1946), the Court reviewed the merits of the
habeas petitions filed by enemy alien prisoners detained in U.S. sovereign (or
then-sovereign) territory. In Quirin, the Court rejected on the merits
the claim of enemy German petitioners held in Washington DC (and executed there)
that the President was without statutory or constitutional authority to order
them to be tried by a military commission for the offenses with which they were
charged and had been convicted by the Commission; it then ruled that the
Commission had been lawfully constituted and the petitioners lawfully tried and
punished by it. 317 U.S. at 20-21. In Yamashita, the Court reviewed on
the merits a similar World War II habeas claim on behalf of an enemy Japanese
general, detained in the Philippines, which was U.S. territory at the time.
Yamashita had already been tried, convicted, and sentenced to death by a
military commission. Following Quirin, 327 U.S. at 7-9, the Court
determined that the commission had been lawfully constituted, and that
petitioner was lawfully detained pursuant to his conviction and sentence. Id.
at 25- 6. We need not resolve the question of what constitutional claims
persons detained at Guantanamo may properly allege if jurisdiction to entertain
habeas claims exists.
Suffice
it to say that if jurisdiction does lie, the detainees are not wholly without
rights to challenge in habeas their indefinite detention without a hearing or
trial of any kind, and the conditions of such detention.
1.
Territorial Jurisdiction and Sovereignty
With
respect to the Guantanamo detainees, the government contends that, under Johnson,
the touchstone of the jurisdictional inquiry is sovereignty–not mere territorial
jurisdiction–and that the United States does not maintain sovereignty over
the territory at issue. Jurisdiction is foreclosed, the government argues,
because although the 1903 Lease agreement (and the 1934 Treaty continuing the
agreement [“the Lease and continuing Treaty”])9
which governs the terms of Guantanamo’s territorial relationship to the United
States cedes to the U.S. “complete jurisdiction and control” over the Base,
it recognizes the “continuance of ultimate sovereignty” in Cuba. In other
words, in the government’s view, whatever the Lease and continuing Treaty say
about the United States’ complete territorial jurisdiction, Guantanamo
falls outside U.S. sovereign territory–a distinction it asserts is
controlling under Johnson.
Although
we agree with the government that the outcome of the jurisdictional question in
this case hinges on the legal status of the situs of Gherebi’s
detention, we do not read Johnson as holding that the prerequisite for
the exercise of jurisdiction is sovereignty rather than territorial
jurisdiction. Nor do we believe that the jurisdiction the United States
exercised over Landsberg Prison in Germany is in any way analogous to the
jurisdiction that this nation exercises over Guantanamo. When the Johnson petitioners
were detained in Landsberg, the limited and shared authority the U.S. exercised
over the Prison on a temporary basis nowhere approached the United States’
potentially permanent exercise of complete jurisdiction and control over
Guantanamo, including the right of eminent domain. The United States has
exercised “complete jurisdiction and control” over the Base for more than
one century now, “with the right to acquire...any land or other property
therein by purchase or by exercise of eminent domain with full compensation to
the owners thereof.”10 We have also treated
Guantanamo as if it were subject to American sovereignty: we have acted as if we
intend to retain the Base permanently, and have exercised the exclusive,
unlimited right to use it as we wish, regardless of any restrictions contained
in the Lease or continuing Treaty.
When
conducting its jurisdictional inquiry in Johnson, the Court spoke at
different times of U.S. “territorial jurisdiction” and
“sovereignty”–using the latter term on a minority of occasions11
because it was indisputable that Landsberg Prison was not within either
U.S. territorial jurisdiction or U.S. sovereign territory. The only question for
the Johnson Court was whether it could exercise jurisdiction over
petitioners’ habeas claims in light of the fact that they were being detained
on foreign ground that was not, under any recognized legal standard, treated as
American territory. And while the Court expressly distinguished Yamashita on
the basis that the United States possessed “sovereignty at this time
over these insular possessions,” (the Philippines), the Court nowhere
suggested that “sovereignty,” as opposed to “territorial jurisdiction,”
was a necessary factor. In fact, immediately following this statement, the Court
specifically noted three “heads of jurisdiction” that petitioners
might have invoked, none of which used the term “sovereignty” and all of
which referred instead to “territory”:
Yamashita’s
offenses were committed on our territory, he was tried within the jurisdiction
of our insular courts and he was imprisoned within territory of the
United States. None of these heads of jurisdiction can be invoked by these
prisoners.
Id.
at
780 (emphasis added). Accordingly, Johnson in no way compels the
conclusion that, where the U.S. exercises “territorial jurisdiction” over a
situs, that degree of territorial authority and control is not sufficient to
support habeas jurisdiction . To the contrary, it strongly implies that
territorial jurisdiction is sufficient. In short, we do not believe that Johnson
may properly be read to require “sovereignty” as an essential
prerequisite of habeas jurisdiction.12 Rather
territorial jurisdiction is enough.
It
is evident that the United States exercises sole territorial jurisdiction over
Guantanamo. “Territorial jurisdiction” exists as to “territory over which
a government or a subdivision thereof, or court, has jurisdiction.” See BLACK’S
LAW DICTIONARY 1473 (6th ed. 1990). The U.S. government exercises the “power
to proscribe, prescribe, adjudicate, and enforce the law” in Guantanamo, see
New Jersey v. New York, No. 120, 1997 WL 291594, at * 28 (U.S. 1997), received
at 520 U.S. 1273, and reviewed at 523 U.S. 767 (1998) (describing the
“natural and ordinary meaning of ‘jurisdiction’”), and further, the
government’s jurisdiction is both “complete,” see 1903 Lease, art.
III, supra note 9, and exclusive, see 1903 Supplemental Agreement,
art. IV, id (providing that U.S. courts exercise exclusive criminal
jurisdiction over citizens and aliens, alike, for offenses committed on the
Base). See also 6 Op. Off. Legal Counsel 236, 242 (1982) (opinion of then
Asst.
Attorney
General Ted Olsen) (concluding that Guantanamo falls within “exclusive United
States’ jurisdiction,” “because of the lease terms which grant the United
States ‘complete jurisdiction and control over’ that property”). Where a
nation exercises “exclusive jurisdiction” over a territory, territorial
jurisdiction lies. See U.S. v. Corey, 232 F.3d 1166, 1172-76 (9th Cir.
2000) (examining a provision of a congressional act that defined territorial
jurisdiction to include territory within the “exclusive jurisdiction” of the
United States).
Here,
the relationship between territorial jurisdiction and the right to file habeas
petitions is particularly clear. The United States exercises exclusive criminal
jurisdiction over all persons, citizens and aliens alike, who commit criminal
offenses at the Base, pursuant to Article IV of the Supplemental Agreement. See
supra note 9. We subject persons who commit crimes at Guantanamo to trial in
United States courts.13 Surely, such persons enjoy
the right to habeas corpus in at least some respects. Under these circumstances,
for purposes of our jurisdictional inquiry, it is apparent that the United
States exercises exclusive territorial jurisdiction over Guantanamo and that by
virtue of its exercise of such jurisdiction, habeas rights exist for persons
located at the Base. We reiterate that the essence of our inquiry involves the
legal status of the situs of petitioner’s detention–not the question whether
“enemy combatants” in general are precluded from filing habeas petitions, or
the question whether any particular constitutional issues may be raised.
The
first of these questions is answered by Quirin and Yamashita and
the second is not before us.
In
sum, we conclude that by virtue of the United States’ exercise of territorial
jurisdiction over Guantanamo, habeas jurisdiction lies in the present case.14
Although our conclusion is dispositive of the principal issue before us, we also
consider an alternative ground for our holding: whether the U.S. exercises
sovereignty over Guantanamo.
2.
Sovereignty and the 1903 Lease and Continuing Treaty of 1934
Even
if we assume that Johnson requires sovereignty, our decision that habeas
jurisdiction lies is the same. In this regard, we conclude that, at least for
habeas purposes, Guantanamo is a part of the sovereign territory of the United
States. Both the language of the Lease and continuing Treaty and the practical
reality of U.S. authority and control over the Base support that answer.
Moreover, the present case is far more analogous to Yamashita than to Johnson:
here, like in Yamashita but contrary to the circumstances in Johnson,
the United States exercises total dominion and control over the territory in
question and possesses rights of eminent domain, powers inherent in the exercise
of sovereignty, while Cuba retains simply a contingent reversionary interest
that will become effective only if and when the United States decides to
relinquish its exclusive jurisdiction and control, i.e. sovereign dominion, over
the territory. Thus, we hold that the prerequisite to the exercise of habeas
jurisdiction is met in the case of Guantanamo, whether that prerequisite be
“territorial jurisdiction” or “sovereignty.” We now turn to an analysis
of the term “sovereignty” and its application, for purposes of habeas, to
the United States’ role at Guantanamo. The government argues that, under the
plain terms of the Lease, the “continuance” of Cuba’s “ultimate”
sovereignty means that Cuba retains “maximum” or “definitive”
sovereignty over the Base during the indefinite period of U.S. reign, and
consequently, that Guantanamo cannot be classified as U.S. sovereign territory
for the purposes of our jurisdictional inquiry. The government’s assertion
requires us to consider whether “ultimate” is to be construed as a
“temporal” or a “qualitative” modifier. In other words, does the Lease
(and the 1934 continuing Treaty) vest sovereignty in Cuba “ultimately” in
the sense that Cuba’s sovereignty becomes substantively effective if and when
the United States decides to abandon its physical and absolute control of the
territory (or to put it differently, is Cuba’s sovereignty residual in a temporal
sense); or does the Lease (and the continuing Treaty) vest “basic,
fundamental” or “maximum” (the alternative qualitative meaning of
“ultimate” discussed infra) sovereignty in Cuba at all times, and
specifically during the indefinite period in which the United States
maintains complete jurisdiction and control over the Base? We conclude that, as
used in the Lease, “ultimate sovereignty”can only mean temporal and not
qualitative sovereignty. We also conclude that, during the unlimited and
potentially permanent period of U.S. possession and control over Guantanamo, the
United States possesses and exercises all of the attributes of sovereignty,
while Cuba retains only a residual or reversionary sovereignty interest,
contingent on a possible future United States’ decision to surrender its
complete jurisdiction and control.15
“Ultimate” is defined principally in temporal, not qualitative, terms. Black’s
Law Dictionary defines “ultimate” to mean:
At
last, finally, at the end. The last in the train of progression or sequence
tended toward by all that preceeds; arrived at as the last result; final.
BLACK’S
LAW DICTIONARY 1522. Similarly, Webster’s Third New International’s
first two definitions state:
ultimatus
completed, last,
final 1a: most remote in space or time: farthest, earliest ...
2a:
tended toward by all that preceeds: arrived at as the last result...
WEBSTER’S
THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 2479 (1976). Webster’s then gives as
the less-frequently used meaning the definition urged here by the government:
3a:
basic, fundamental, original, primitive...
4:
maximum Id.
The
primary definition (including Webster’s first and second meanings)
dictates a construction of the Lease under which sovereignty reverts to Cuba if
and when the United States decides to relinquish control. Therefore, under that
definition, the United States enjoys sovereignty during the period it occupies
the territory. Adopting the alternative qualitative construction (Webster’s
third and fourth meanings, and the government’s proffered definition)
would render the word “ultimate” wholly superfluous. If the Lease vests
sovereignty in Cuba during the indefinite period as to which it has ceded to the
U.S. “complete jurisdiction and control,” nothing would be added to the use
of the term “sovereignty” by employing a modifier describing sovereignty as
“basic, fundamental” or “maximum.” If the government’s understanding
of ultimate were correct, no sovereignty would vest in the United States at any
time and all sovereignty would vest in Cuba at all times with or without the use
of the word “ultimate.” In such circumstance, a simple statement that Cuba
retains sovereignty would suffice. In contrast, construing “ultimate” to
mean “last, final” or “arrived at as the last result,” or in practical
terms a reversionary right if and when the lease is terminated by the United
States, serves to define the nature of Cuban sovereignty provided for under the
Lease and gives meaning and substantive effect to the term “ultimate.” Under
the preferred construction of “ultimate,” the use of that term in the Lease
establishes the temporal and contingent nature of Cuba’s sovereignty,
specifying that it comes into being only in the event that the United States
abandons Guantanamo: in such case, Guantanamo reverts to Cuba and to Cuban
sovereignty rather than being subject to some other actual or attempted
disposition. Most important, under the preferred temporal construction, Cuba
does not retain any substantive sovereignty during the term of the U.S.
occupation, with the result that, during such period, sovereignty vests in the
United States. This Court’s duty to give effect, where possible, to every word
of a treaty, see United States v. Menasche, 348 U.S. 528, 538-539 (1955),
should make us reluctant to deem treaty terms, or terms used in other important
international agreements, as surplusage.
See
Duncan v. Walker,
533 U.S. 167, 174 (2001). This is especially the case when a term occupies a
pivotal place in a legal scheme, id., as does the word “ultimate” in
Article III of the 1903 Lease. In construing the Lease and continuing Treaty, we
adopt the primary, temporal definition of the term, as used in the English
language–a term that gives its use as a modifier substantive meaning.16
That the Lease uses the word “continuance” to describe Cuba’s “ultimate
sovereignty” does nothing to undercut the temporal construction of
“ultimate.” As we have explained, during the period the United States
exercises dominion and control, i.e. sovereignty, over Guantanamo, Cuba retains
a contingent sovereign interest–a reversionary right that springs into being
upon a lawful termination of the U.S. reign. It is this reversionary interest
that is “continued” even as substantive (or qualitative) sovereignty is
ceded to the United States. In effect, the lease functions not unlike a standard
land disposition contract familiar in the area of property law, in which the
partitioning of a bundle of rights into present and future interests is
commonplace.17
Finally, the term “ultimate” sovereignty must be construed in context. It is
clearly the temporal definition of “ultimate,” not its qualitative
counterpart, that most naturally and accurately describes the nature of Cuban
sovereignty in Guantanamo. By the plain terms of the agreement, the U.S.
acquires full dominion and control over Guantanamo, as well as the right to
purchase land and the power of eminent domain. Until such time as the United
States determines to surrender its rights, it exercises full and exclusive
executive, legislative and judicial control over the territory, and Cuba retains
no rights of any kind to do anything with respect to the Base.18
If “ultimate” can mean either “final” (temporal) or “basic,
fundamental, and maximum” (qualitative), given that Cuba does not under the
agreement retain any
degree of control
or jurisdiction over Guantanamo during the period of United States occupation,
the use of the term “ultimate” as a modifier of “sovereignty” in that
agreement can only mean “final”(temporal) and not “basic,
fundamental, and maximum” (qualitative). Accordingly, we conclude that the
Lease and continuing Treaty must be construed as providing that Cuba possesses
no substantive sovereignty over Guantanamo during the period of the U.S. reign.
All such sovereignty during that indefinite and potentially permanent period is
vested in the United States.
3.
Conduct of the Parties Subsequent to the Lease and Continuing Treaty
There
is another consideration that militates in favor of our concluding that the
United States is presently exercising sovereignty over Guantanamo. For a
considerable period of time, our government has purposely acted in a manner
directly inconsistent with the terms of the Lease and continuing Treaty. Those
agreements limit U.S. use of the territory to a naval base and coaling station.
Contrary to the relevant provisions of the agreements, the United States has
used the Base for whatever purposes it deemed necessary or desirable. Cuba has
protested these actions in public fora and for years has refused to cash the
United States’ rent checks.
See
Center
for International Policy’s Cuba Project, Statement by the Government of Cuba
to the National and International Public Opinion (Jan. 11, 2002), at http://ciponline.org/cuba/cubaproject/cubanstatement.htm
(last
visited Nov. 10, 2003).
At
the same time, the Cuban government has admitted that it is powerless to prevent
U.S. uses that conflict with the terms of the Lease and continuing Treaty.19
Id.
Sovereignty
may be gained by a demonstration of intent to exercise sovereign control on the
part of a country that is in possession of the territory in question and that
has the power to enforce its will. See States v. Rice, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.)
246, 254 (1819) (hostile occupation gives “firm possession” and the
“fullest rights of sovereignty” to the occupying power, while suspending the
sovereign authority of the land whose territory is being occupied); Cobb v.
U.S., 191 F.2d 604, 608 (9th Cir. 1951) (an occupying power may acquire
sovereignty through an act of formal annexation or “an expression of intention
to retain the conquered territory permanently”); see also Fleming v. Page,
50 U.S. (9 How.) 603, 614 (1850) (the U.S. had
“sovereignty and dominion” over the occupied Mexican territory, where “the
country was in the exclusive and firm possession of the U.S., and governed by
its military authorities acting under the orders of the President”). Cf.
Neely v. Henkel, 180 U.S. 109, 119 (1901) (where the occupation policy
expressly disavows “exercise of sovereignty, jurisdiction, or control” over
the occupied area, and is aimed at the establishment of a government to which
the area may be restored, this occupied territory is considered “foreign”).
With respect to Guantanamo, the sovereign face of U.S. authority and power has
taken shape in recent decades. It has emerged, practically, through the concrete
actions of a powerful nation intent on enforcing the right to use the territory
it occupies without regard to any limitations. Whatever question may have
existed about our sovereignty previously, our insistence on our right to use the
territory for any and all purposes we desire, and our refusal to recognize the
specific limitation on our rights provided in the Lease and continuing Treaty,
removes any doubt that our sovereignty over Guantanamo is complete.
The
United States originally leased the Base, pursuant to the 1903 agreement, for
use as a naval and coaling station. See 1903 Lease, supra note 9.
Base relations remained stable through the two world wars, but after the United
States terminated diplomatic relations with Cuba in 1961, following the Cuban
revolution, the United States began to use the base for purposes contrary to the
terms of the agreement. See Guantanamo
Bay, A Brief History, at http://www.nsgtmo.navy.mil/Default.htm
(last
visited Nov. 10, 2003). At the same time, many citizens of the host country
sought refuge on the Base, and U.S. Marines and Cuban militiamen began
patrolling opposite sides of the Base’s fence line–patrols that have
continued 24 hours a day ever since. Id. In 1964, Fidel Castro cut off
water and supplies to the Base and Guantanamo became and remains entirely
self-sufficient, with its own water plant, schools, transportation,
entertainment facilities, and fast-food establishments. See Gerald
Neuman, Anomalous Zones, 48 STAN. L. REV. 1197, 1198 (1996). As of 1988,
approximately 6,500 people lived on the Base, including civilian employees of
several nationalities, see id. (describing the findings of one
researcher), and the United States has employed hundreds of foreign nationals at
Guantanamo, including Cuban exiles and Jamaicans. Id. at 1128. Today, the
Base is in every way independent of Cuba and in no way reliant on Cuba’s
cooperation.
The
United States’ refusal to limit its dominion and control to the use permitted
by the Lease and continuing Treaty became more pronounced in the 1990's, when
President Clinton used the Base as a detention facility for approximately 50,000
Haitian and Cuban refugees intercepted at sea trying to reach the United States
for refuge.20
See Laura
Bonilla, Afghan War Prisoners in Guantanamo, AGENCE FRANCE-PRESSE, Dec.
29, 2001, available at 2001 WL 25095452. In 1999, President Clinton again
proposed using the Base in a manner not authorized by the terms of the
lease–this time to house 20,000 refugees from Kosovo. See Philip
Shenon, U.S.
Chooses
Guantanamo Bay Base in Cuba for Refugee Site,
N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 7, 1999, at A13. Although, in the end, this plan was not
implemented, the earlier actions only foreshadowed the 2002 arrival of over 600
individuals alleged to be members of Al- Queda or the Taliban, who were
transported to Guantanamo by the U.S. military for reasons wholly unrelated to
the operation of a naval base and coaling station.
If
“sovereignty” is “the supreme, absolute, and uncontrollable power by which
any independent state is governed,” “the power to do everything in a state
without accountability,” or “freedom from external control: autonomy,
independence,”21 it would appear that there is no
stronger example of the United States’ exercise of “supreme power,” or the
adverse nature of its occupying power, than this country’s purposeful actions
contrary to the terms of the lease and over the vigorous objections of a
powerless “lessor.” See also New Jersey, 1997 WL 291594, at * 30
(“The plain and ordinary import of jurisdiction without exception is the
authority of a sovereign.”). Any honest assessment of the nature of United
States’ authority and control in Guantanamo today allows only one conclusion:
the U.S. exercises all of “the basic attribute[s] of full territorial
sovereignty.” See Dura v. Reina, 495 U.S. 676, 685 (1990). Accordingly,
we conclude that, under any reading, Johnson does not bar this Court’s
jurisdiction over Gherebi’s habeas petition.
4.
The Guantanamo Lease and Treaty and the Panama Canal Zone Treaty
Our
conclusion that habeas jurisdiction lies in this case is bolstered by a
comparison of the Guantanamo Lease and continuing Treaty and the Panama Canal
Zone Treaty. The two contemporaneously negotiated agreements are unparalleled
with respect to the nature of the cession of quintessentially sovereign powers
to the United States. Concluded the same year by the Theodore Roosevelt
administration,22 the Guantanamo and Canal Zone
agreements are widely viewed as substantially similar. See, e.g., 35 Op.
Att’y Gen. 536, 540 (1929) (noting that the Canal Zone agreement “would
appear to be no less comprehensive a grant than the lease from Cuba”).23
Both agreements provide for the ceding of all dominion and control over the
territory without temporal limitation, and each limits U.S. use to a particular
purpose. Both afford the U.S. the right of eminent domain and the right to
purchase real property. Both provide for yearly payments to the ceding nation as
specified in the agreements. Only a voluntary act on the part of the United
States could, given the terms of the two agreements, result in the restoration
of the territory to the ceding country.24 Under the
terms of the Panama Convention, in the eyes of our government of the time,
“the sovereignty of the Canal Zone [wa]s not an open or doubtful question.”
26 Op. Att’y Gen. 376, 376 (Sept. 7, 1907). It passed to the United States. As
the Attorney General opined:
Article
3 of the treaty transfers to the United States, not the sovereignty by that
term, but “all the rights, power, and authority” within the Zone that it
would have if it were sovereign, “to the entire exclusion of the exercise by
the Republic of Panama of any such sovereign rights, power or authority...The
omission to use words expressly passing sovereignty was dictated by reasons of
public policy, I assume; but whatever the reason the treaty gives the substance
of sovereignty, and instead of containing a mere declaration transferring
the sovereignty, descends to the particulars “all the rights, power, and
authority” that belong to sovereignty, and negatives any such “sovereign
rights, power, or authority” in the former sovereign.
Id.
at
377-78 (Sept. 7, 1907) (emphasis added). Similarly, the Guantanamo Lease and
continuing Treaty transferred all of the power and authority that together
constitute “sovereignty,” and therefore transferred sovereignty itself. See
25 Op.
Att’y
Gen 441, 444 (1905) (stating that the “Canal Zone is now within the sovereign
jurisdiction of the United States”) (emphasis added); 26 Op. Att’y Gen.
113, 116 (Jan. 30, 1907) (“Unquestionably [Articles II and II] of the treaty
imposed upon the United States the obligations as well as the powers of a sovereign
within the territory described[.]”) (emphasis added); 27 Op. Att’y Gen.
19, 21 (July 24, 1908) (referring to the U.S. as “succeed[ing] to the sovereignty
of the territory” in the Canal Zone) (emphasis added); 41 Op. Att’y Gen.
44, 49-50 (1916) (“[T[he treaty itself...is the patent...by which the United
States acquired its sovereignty and property rights in the Canal Zone”)
(emphasis added). 25
Pursuant to this 1903 Convention, the United States created a complete system of
courts for the Canal Zone, see Egle v. Egle, 715 F.2d 999, 1011 n. 15
(5th Cir. 1983), including a U.S. District Court for the District of the Canal
Zone, a legislative court which exercised both federal and local jurisdiction
over citizens and foreign nationals alike, see FED. R. CRIM. PROC. 54
(Advisory Note to Subdivision (a)(1), ¶ 9 (citing 48 U.S.C. former §§ 1344,
1345)), and issued final decisions reviewable by the Fifth Circuit Court of
Appeals. See 28 U.S.C.A. § 1294. Both the Canal Zone district court and
the Fifth Circuit had jurisdiction to hear the habeas petitions of detainees in
the Zone. See Voloshin v. Ridenour, 299 F. 134 (5th Cir. 1924) (reviewing
three habeas petitions against a U.S. Marshal for the Canal Zone). This
jurisdictional regime continued in existence until October 1979, when, “by the
Panama Canal Treaty, the United States relinquished sovereignty over the
Canal Zone.” Egle, 715 F.2d at 1010 (emphasis added). See supra note
24.
Information
about the practical implementation of the jurisdictional regime that exists in
Guantanamo is comparatively sparse. But see supra note 13. As we have
explained in Section II(A)(1), however, pursuant to Article IV of the 1903
Supplemental Agreement, the United States exercises exclusive jurisdiction over
citizens and aliens alike who commit crimes on the Base. Such persons are
subject to trial for their offenses in United States courts.26
Under the Agreement and continuing Treaty, Cuba is required to turn over to the
U.S. authorities any persons, including Cubans, who commit an offense at
Guantanamo. See supra note 9.
That,
in the case of the Canal Zone, the U.S. established a court physically located
in the territory whereas in the case of Guantanamo it used the services of U.S.
courts
located on the mainland is of no legal significance. What is critical is that in
both instances, the United States exercised criminal jurisdiction over the
territory and the persons there present, and that U.S. criminal statutes applied
to aliens and U.S. citizens alike. In such circumstances, it is difficult to
understand why persons who are subject to criminal prosecution in the United
States for acts committed at Guantanamo should not have the right to seek a writ
of habeas corpus for an alleged wrong committed against them at that
location–including the act of unlawful detention. Indeed, Article IV of the
Supplemental Agreement would appear to be dispositive of the jurisdictional
question before us.
In
sum, the similarity between the Guantanamo and Canal Zone agreements–two sets
of documents unique in the nature of their cession of exclusive dominion and
control to the United States–provides additional support for our conclusion
that jurisdiction lies over Gherebi’s claim. The fact the Canal Zone district
court and the Fifth Circuit entertained individual claims both constitutional
and non-constitutional until Panama re-assumed sovereign control, and that U.S.
courts have exercised criminal, if not civil, jurisdiction over actions
occurring at Guantanamo, simply provides one further compelling reason why we
are unwilling to close the doors of the United States courts to Gherebi’s
habeas claim.
5.
Limited Nature of the Question Presented
We
wish to emphasize that the case before this Court does not require us to
consider a habeas petition challenging the decisions of a military tribunal–a
case that might raise different issues. Unlike the petitioners in Johnson,
and even in Yamashita and Quirin, Gherebi has not been subjected
to a military trial. Nor has the government employed the other time-tested
alternatives for dealing with the circumstances of war: it has neither treated
Gherebi as a prisoner of war (and has in fact declared that he is not entitled
to the rights of the Geneva Conventions, see supra note 7), nor has it
sought to prosecute him under special procedures designed to safeguard national
security. See U.S. v. Bin Laden, 2001 WL 66393 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 25, 2001)
(limiting access to confidential information). Instead, the government is
following an unprecedented alternative27:
under the government’s theory, it is free to imprison Gherebi indefinitely
along with hundreds of other citizens of foreign countries, friendly nations
among them, and to do with Gherebi and these detainees as it will, when it
pleases, without any compliance with any rule of law of any kind, without
permitting him to consult counsel, and without acknowledging any judicial forum
in which its actions may be challenged. Indeed, at oral argument, the government
advised us that its position would be the same even if the claims were that it
was engaging in acts of torture or that it was summarily executing the
detainees. To our knowledge, prior to the current detention of prisoners at
Guantanamo, the U.S. government has never before asserted such a grave and
startling proposition. Accordingly, we view Guantanamo as unique not only
because the United States’ territorial relationship with the Base is without
parallel today, but also because it is the first time that the government has
announced such an extraordinary set of principles–a position so extreme that
it raises the gravest concerns under both American and international law.
6.
Conclusion
In
sum, we hold that neither Johnson v. Eisentrager nor any other legal
precedent precludes our assertion of jurisdiction over Gherebi’s habeas
petition.
Although
we agree with the government that the legal status of Guantanamo constitutes the
dispositive factor in our jurisdictional inquiry, we do not find that Johnson
requires sovereignty rather than simply the existence of territorial
jurisdiction, which unquestionably exists here. Alternatively, we conclude that
both the Lease and continuing Treaty as well as the practical reality of the
U.S.’s exercise of unrestricted dominion and control over the Base compel the
conclusion that, for the purposes of habeas jurisdiction, Guantanamo is
sovereign U.S. territory.
B.
The Jurisdiction of the U.S. District Court for the Central District of
California
Having
determined that Johnson and other legal precedent do not act as a bar to
the jurisdiction of Article III courts, we turn now to the question of whether
the District Court for the Central District of California has personal
jurisdiction over a proper respondent in this case. The habeas corpus statute,
28 U.S.C. § 2241(a), permits the writ to be granted by district courts
“within their respective jurisdictions.” The writ ...does not act upon the
prisoner who seeks relief, but upon the person who holds him in what is alleged
to be unlawful custody....Read literally, the language of § 2241(a) requires
nothing more than that the court issuing the writ have jurisdiction over the
custodian.28
Braden v. 30th
Judicial Circuit Court of Kentucky,
410 U.S.. 484, 495 (emphasis added). A court has personal jurisdiction in
a habeas case “so long as the custodian can be reached by service of
process.” Id.
The
government argues, based on Schlanger v. Seamans, 401 U.S. 487, 489
(1971), that the custodian must be physically present so that he may be
served in the Central District. In Schlanger, the Court concluded that
“the absence of the [proper] custodian is fatal to the jurisdiction of
the Arizona District Court.” Id. at 491(emphasis added). However, one
year later, in Strait v. Laird, 406 U.S. 341, 345 (1972), the Court
distinguished Schlanger, see id. at 344-45, and held that habeas
jurisdiction is proper even though the custodian is not physically present
in the relevant district, as long as the custodian is within reach of the
court’s process. The Court reasoned:
That
such “presence” may suffice for personal jurisdiction is well settled, McGee
v. Int’l Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220; Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington,
326 U.S. 310, and the concept is also not a novel one as regards to habeas
corpus jurisdiction. In Ex Parte Endo, 323 U.S. 283, we said that habeas
corpus may issue “if a respondent who has custody of the prisoner is within
reach of the court’s process....” Strait’s commanding officer is
“present” in California through his contacts in that State; he is
therefore “within reach” of the federal court in which Strait filed his
petition.
See
Donigian v. Laird,
308 F.Supp. 449, 453; cf. United States ex. rel. Armstrong v. Wheeler,
D.C., 321 F.Supp. 471, 475.
Id.
at
345 n.2 (emphasis added). By invoking International Shoe, and speaking in
terms of “contacts” and the “reach of the court’s process,” the Court
in Strait imported the standard doctrine of personal jurisdiction into
the analysis of jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. See also id. at
349 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (noting that the majority opinion in Strait held
that “the type of contacts that have been found to support state jurisdiction
over nonresidents under cases like [International Shoe] would also
suffice for habeas jurisdiction”).
Having
established that Secretary Rumsfeld need not be physically present in order for
the Central District to exercise jurisdiction, the next question is whether the
Secretary has the requisite “minimum contacts” to satisfy the forum
state’s long-arm statute,29 which extends
jurisdiction to the limits of due process. See CAL. CODE OF CIV. PRO.
410.10. Constitutional due process concerns are satisfied when a nonresident
defendant has “certain minimum contacts with the forum such that the
maintenance of the suit does not offend traditional conceptions of fair play and
substantial justice.” Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316
(1945). Where a defendant’s activities in the forum are substantial,
continuous, and systematic, general jurisdiction is available, and the foreign
defendant is subject to suit even on matters unrelated to his or her contacts
with the forum. Perkins v. Benguet Consolidated Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437
(1952). Here, the activities of Secretary Rumsfeld and the department he heads
are substantial, continuous, and systematic throughout the state of California:
California has the largest number of military facilities in the nation
(sixty-one), including major military installations, Department of Defense
laboratories, and testing facilities. See California’s Technology,
Trade, and Commerce Agency, Business & Community Resources, Military Base
Revitalization, http://www.commerce.ca.gov/state/ttca (last visited Nov. 10,
2003). Many of these activities are carried out in the Central District of
California. Accordingly, we conclude that Secretary Rumsfeld has the requisite
“minimum contacts” to satisfy California’s long-arm statute, and we hold
that the United States District Court for the Central District has jurisdiction
over Gherebi’s nominal custodian, Secretary Rumsfeld, for purposes of §
2241(a).
C.
Venue
Although
we hold that Johnson does not bar habeas jurisdiction and further
determine that the Central District may exercise personal jurisdiction over the
Secretary, the question of venue presents a final, additional issue. The
government has suggested that we might transfer the petition to the Eastern
District of Virginia.30 The applicable rule is that
“for the convenience of parties and witnesses, in the interest of justice, a
district court may transfer any civil action to any other district or division
where it might have been brought.” 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a); cf. 28 U.S.C.
§ 1406(a) (providing for transfer where venue is wrongly laid).31
In making the decision to transfer, a court must balance the preference accorded
the plaintiff’s choice of forum with the burden of litigating in an
inconvenient forum.
The
defendant must make a strong showing of inconvenience to warrant upsetting the
plaintiff’s choice of forum. As part of this inquiry, the court should
consider private and public interest factors affecting the convenience of the
forum. Private factors include the “relative ease of access to sources of
proof; availability of compulsory process for attendance of unwilling; and the
cost of obtaining attendance of willing witnesses; possibility of view of
premises, if view would be appropriate to the action; and all other practical
problems that make the trial of a case easy, expeditious and inexpensive.” Gulf
Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501, 508 (1947). Public factors include
“the administrative difficulties flowing from court congestion; the ‘local
interest in having localized controversies decided at home;’ the interest in
having the trial of a diversity case in a forum that is at home with the law
that must govern the action; the avoidance of unnecessary problems in conflict
of laws, or in the application of foreign law and the unfairness of burdening
citizens in an unrelated forum with jury duty.” Piper Aircraft, 454
U.S. at 241 n.6 (quoting Gulf Oil Corp., 330 U.S. at 509).
Decker
Coal Co. v. Commonwealth Edison Co.,
805 F.2d 834, 843 (9th Cir. 1986).
Some
of the above considerations are clearly not applicable to habeas cases.
Moreover,
as a general matter, the district court is not required to “determine the best
venue,” Bates v. C & S Adjusters, Inc., 980 F.2d 865, 867 (2d Cir.
1992) (discussing the general venue statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1391), and transfer
under § 1404(a) “should not be freely granted.” In re Nine Mile, Ltd.,
692 F.2d 56, 61 (8th Cir. 1982). Section 1404(a) provides for transfer to a more
convenient forum, “not to a forum likely to prove equally convenient or
inconvenient,” Van Dusen v. Barrack. 376 U.S. 612, 646 (1964), and a
“transfer should not be granted if the effect is simply to shift the
inconvenience to the party resisting the transfer.” Id. Further, there
is a strong “presumption in favor of plaintiff’s choice of forums.” Gulf
Oil, 330 U.S. at 508.
This
presumption must be taken into account when deciding whether the convenience of
the parties–rather than the convenience of respondent–requires
a transfer.
In
the typical habeas case, problems of venue are simplified by the fact that
“the person with the immediate control over the prisoner has the literal power
to ‘produce’ the body and is generally located in the same place as the
petitioner.” Henderson, 157 F.3d at 152. Here, however, the
question is significantly more complicated. The place where the prisoner is
being held and in which the immediate custodian is located is not a suitable or
even possible venue; instead, a next-friend habeas movant, resident of
California, is petitioning on behalf of a prisoner held outside of the physical
confines of the United States. Also, in this case, factors such as the
convenience of parties and witnesses and the ease of access to sources of proof
cannot be weighed with the same ease and transparency afforded by the typical
habeas proceeding.
Finally,
the public interest factors, which may be of critical importance here, are such
that it is not possible to evaluate them adequately until after the government
has presented its arguments in the district court.
In
short, here, the question of the appropriate venue involves different
considerations than are present in the ordinary case. While respondent
Rumsfeld’s presence in the Eastern District of Virginia might appear, at first
blush, to warrant transfer to that district, there may be substantial
considerations that will weigh in favor of determining that venue is proper in
the Central District of California.32 In any event,
the government has not formally moved to transfer pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §
1404(a) or put forth the appropriate evidence to support its case;33
the parties have not briefed this issue; and no court has had occasion to
consider the relevant factors bearing on venue such as ease of access to sources
of proof and the convenience and cost of obtaining witnesses. Finally, the
public interest factors in this case may require particularly careful scrutiny
once the complete record is before the district court. All of these questions
are best resolved, in the first instance, by the district court, and we express
no view on the proper outcome here. Accordingly, we remand to the Central
District to determine whether venue is proper, should the government renew its
motion in that forum.
D.
The desirability of a full exploration of the jurisdictional issues by the
Courts of Appeals.
The
dissent asserts that we should defer our decision in this case until after the
Supreme Court has decided the pending Guantanamo detainee case in which
certiorari has been granted. Al Odah v. United States, 321 F.3d 1134
(D.C. Cir. 2003), cert. granted, 2003 WL 22070725 (Nov. 10, 2003). We
strongly disagree. The Supreme Court has always encouraged the Courts of Appeal
to resolve issues properly before them in advance of their determination by the
Supreme Court, reasoning that having a variety of considered perspectives will
aid the Court’s ultimate resolution of the issue in question. See United
States v. Sperry Corp., 493 U.S. 52, 66 (1989) (noting that the Court
“benefit[s] from the views of the Court[s] of Appeals”); United States v.
Mendoza,
464 U.S. 154, 160 (1984) (noting that the Court benefits when several Courts of
Appeal hear an issue prior to Supreme Court review); E. I. Du Pont de Nemours
& Co. v. Train, 430 U.S. 112, 135 (1977) (lauding the “wisdom of
allowing difficult issues to mature through full consideration by the courts of
appeals” and noting that having a variety of perspectives can “vastly
simplif[y] our task”). Circuit courts have also noted the importance of
several circuits’ examining important legal questions before the Supreme Court
makes a final determination. Va. Soc'y for Human Life, Inc. v. FEC, 263
F.3d 379, 393 (4th Cir. 2001) (emphasizing that opinions from multiple circuits
helps develop “important questions of law” and that the Supreme Court
benefits from “decisions from several courts of appeals”);
Atchison,
T. & S.F. Ry. v. Pena,
44 F.3d 437, 447 (7th Cir. 1994) (Easterbrook, J., concurring) (noting that
conflicting decisions “among the circuits . . . [lend] the Supreme Court [the]
benefit of additional legal views that increase the probability of a correct
disposition”). This is especially the case here, given the importance of the
issue, the dearth of considered opinions, and the conflict in views and
reasoning that, as a result of our opinion, will now be available to the Supreme
Court.
III.
CONCLUSION
We
hold that the district court erred in concluding, based on Johnson v.
Eisentrager, that no district court would have jurisdiction over Gherebi’s
habeas petition. We also hold that the Central District may exercise
jurisdiction in this case because the Secretary of Defense is subject to service
of process under the California long-arm statute. Finally, we remand to the
district court for consideration of the question whether transfer to a different
district than the Central District of California would be appropriate.
REVERSED
AND REMANDED FOR FURTHER PROCEEDINGS CONSISTENT WITH THIS OPINION.
Counsel
Stephen Yagman, Esq., Venice, California, for Petitioner-Appellant.
Paul
Clement, Department of Justice, Washington, DC, for Respondents-Appellees.
Gherebi
v. Bush, No. 03-55785 GRABER, Circuit Judge, dissenting:
With
regret, I must respectfully dissent.
The
second sentence of its opinion contains the key to the majority’s errors here:
"The issues we are required to confront are new, important, and
difficult." Maj. op. at 2. Although the issues that we confront are
important and difficult, they are not new. Because the issues are not new, we
are bound by existing Supreme Court precedent, which the majority misreads.
Because the issues are important and difficult, the Supreme Court has decided to
revisit them, and we should await the Supreme Court’s imminent decision.
1.
Johnson v. Eisentrager In Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763 (1950),
the Supreme Court held that an enemy alien who was detained by the United States
military overseas could not bring a petition for habeas corpus in the courts of
the United States. Our courts lack jurisdiction in that circumstance, and the
sole remedy for the enemy alien lies with the political branches of government.1
Id. at 779-81.
A
straightforward reading of Johnson makes it clear that "sovereignty"
is the touchstone, under current law, for the exercise of federal courts’
jurisdiction. As the Supreme Court explained, the petitioners in Johnson could
not bring a habeas petition because they committed crimes, were captured, were
tried, and were being detained outside "any territory over which the United
States is sovereign." Id. at 777.
The
majority invents the novel proposition that, because the Supreme Court used the
phrase "territorial jurisdiction" more often than it used the term
"sovereignty," the former concept governs and the latter may be
disregarded. Maj. op. at 18-19. Counting phrases is not, in my view, a valid
method of analyzing the Court’s meaning.
More
telling is the way in which the Court distinguished cases in which enemy aliens
were allowed to bring habeas petitions in federal courts, cases like Yamashita
v.
Styer
(In re Yamashita), 327 U.S. 1 (1946). In Johnson the Court held that Yamashita
was different because, in Yamashita, the United States had
"sovereignty" over the place where the petitioner was held and,
therefore, the federal courts had jurisdiction "[b]y reason of our
sovereignty." Johnson, 339 U.S. at 780. "Sovereignty" was the
only distinction on which Johnson relied. There may be, as the majority argues,
other possible distinctions, but they were of no moment to the Johnson Court,
whose opinion we must construe.
In
short, the holding in Johnson precludes federal courts from exercising
jurisdiction over an enemy alien who is detained—and who has always
been—outside the sovereign territory of the United States. Only the Supreme
Court may modify the "sovereignty" rule established by Johnson. See
Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/Am.
Express,
Inc., 490 U.S. 477, 484 (1989) ("If a precedent of this Court has
direct application in a case, yet appears to rest on reasons rejected in some
other line of decisions, the Court of Appeals should follow the case which
directly controls, leaving to this Court the prerogative of overruling its own
decisions."). The majority cites no authority in which the Supreme Court
has declared that Johnson is no longer good law.
The
Supreme Court has granted certiorari in a consolidated appeal that presents an
opportunity for the Court to revisit Johnson’s "sovereignty" rule.
See Al Odah v.
United
States, 321 F.3d 1134 (D.C. Cir. 2003), supra note 1. Until the Supreme Court
informs us otherwise, however, the key inquiry remains whether the Guantanamo
Bay Naval Base ("Guantanamo") is sovereign territory of the United
States.
2.
The Status of Guantanamo Bay Naval Base a. The Guantanamo Lease (i) The Lease
Recognizes the "Continuance of Ultimate Sovereignty" by Cuba Over
Guantanamo.
The
majority concludes "that, at least for habeas purposes, Guantanamo is a
part of the sovereign territory of the United States." Maj. op. at 25-26.
There are two things wrong with that sentence.
First,
it is unclear how a place can be, as the majority implies Guantanamo is, a part
of "the sovereign territory of the United States" for habeas purposes
but not for other purposes. The "sovereignty" that Johnson requires
appears to be the ordinary kind. Cf. Black’s Law Dictionary 1402 (7th ed.
1999) (defining "sovereignty" as: "1. Supreme dominion,
authority, or rule. 2. The supreme political authority of an independent state.
3. The state itself.").
Second,
and more fundamentally, Guantanamo is the sovereign territory of Cuba. The
relevant treaty explains that "the United States recognizes the continuance
of the ultimate sovereignty of the Republic of Cuba over the above described
areas of land and water." Agreement Between the United States and Cuba for
the Lease of Lands for Coaling and Naval Stations, Feb. 16-23, 1903, U.S.-Cuba,
art. III, T.S. No. 418 ("Guantanamo Lease") (emphasis added).2
The majority’s interpretation of the Guantanamo Lease is problematic because
the majority takes the phrase "ultimate sovereignty" out of context. I
already have cited the definition of "sovereignty." The 1913 version
of Webster’s Revised Unabridged Dictionary offers these definitions for
"ultimate":
1.
Farthest; most remote in space or time; extreme; last; final.
2.
Last in a train of progression or consequences; tended toward by all that
precedes; arrived at, as the last result; final.
3.
Incapable of further analysis; incapable of further division or separation;
constituent; elemental; as, an ultimate constituent of matter.
Webster’s
Revised Unabridged Dictionary 1560 (1913), http://humanities.uchicago.edu/forms_unrest/webster.form.html
The
majority reads the Lease’s use of "ultimate" in the temporal sense
("most remote in . . . time"). In context, however, I believe that the
Lease is using "ultimate" in the sense of "extreme,"
"incapable of further division or separation," or
"elemental." That is, key to understanding the phrase "ultimate
sovereignty" is to recognize the significance of the contextual term
"continuance."3 The 1913 dictionary offers
these definitions for "continuance":
1.
A holding on, or remaining in a particular state; permanence, as of condition,
habits, abode, etc.; perseverance; constancy; duration; stay.
2.
Uninterrupted succession; continuation; constant renewell [sic]; perpetuation;
propagation.
3.
A holding together; continuity. [Obs.]
4.
(Law) (a) The adjournment of the proceedings in a cause from one day, or from
one stated term of a court, to another. (b) The entry of such adjournment and
the grounds thereof on the record.
Id.
at 313. The only definitions that make sense in the present context are the
first and second ones—the third being obsolete, and the fourth being obviously
irrelevant.
Thus,
the Lease’s use of the word "continuance" denotes the ongoing nature
of Cuba’s "ultimate sovereignty" over Guantanamo.
The
majority’s attempt to explain away the contextual use of the words
"continuance" and "ultimate" is unpersuasive. The majority
reads the Lease to vest in Cuba only a "contingent sovereign interest—a
reversionary right that springs into being upon a lawful termination of the U.S.
reign. It is this reversionary interest that is ‘continued’ even as
substantive (or qualitative) sovereignty is ceded to the United States."
Maj. op. at 32.
The
Lease might have created such a reversionary right (although I read it
differently). But the Lease logically could not have continued such a right,
because no such "reversionary" right existed before the Lease was
signed (when Cuba indisputably was the sole sovereign over Guantanamo).
By
contrast, if "ultimate" refers not to the temporal activation of a
reversionary interest, but to ongoing elemental, indivisible sovereignty, the
whole phrase—"the continuance of the ultimate sovereignty of the Republic
of Cuba"—in the Guantanamo Lease makes sense. The Lease is discussing the
continuance of the elemental, indivisible sovereignty of Cuba with respect to
Guantanamo.4 The drafters of the Lease wanted to make
clear that, although the United States was granted powers that often run with
sovereignty (e.g., "complete jurisdiction and control"), in fact Cuba
was retaining all sovereignty over Guantanamo for itself. That is to say, Cuba
retained ultimate, or elemental, or indivisible sovereignty, despite the fact
that the United States would be allowed to act, de facto, a lot like a sovereign
would act.
The
majority’s concerns about what the word "ultimate" could add to the
concept of "sovereignty," maj. op. at 29-31, are thus misplaced. The
Lease goes to great pains to explain that all sovereignty over Guantanamo is
"unbundled" from the rights of jurisdiction and control. Cuba keeps
the former continually, while the United States enjoys the latter. The word
"ultimate" serves the purpose of preventing the United States from
asserting that it has any legal sovereignty deriving from the jurisdiction and
control that it enjoys. In the absence of the word "ultimate," one
could conclude that Cuba had handed over not only the rights to jurisdiction and
control, but also the underlying sovereignty that forms the basis for the
authority to enjoy (or, as here, to transfer the right to enjoy) those rights.
The
contemporaneously signed Spanish version of the Lease supports a substantive,
rather than temporal, understanding of the term "ultimate" even more
strongly than the English version. See United State v. Percheman, 32 U.S. (7
Pet.) 51, 88 (1833) ("If the English and the Spanish parts can, without
violence, be made to agree, that construction which establishes this conformity
ought to prevail."). The Spanish version of the disputed text reads:
"Si bien los Estados Unidos reconocen por su parte la continuación de la
soberania definitiva de la República de Cuba." Convenio de 16/23 de
Febrero de 1903, Entre la República de Cuba y los Estados Unidos de América
para arrendar á los Estados Unidos (bajos las condiciones que habran de
convenires por los dos Gobiernos) tierras en Cuban para estaciones carboneras y
navales, Tratados, Convenios y Convenciones (Habana 1936)
(emphasis added). There is
no dispute that "soberania" refers to "sovereignty" or that
"continuación" equates to the English cognate
"continuation." The word "definitiva" is the feminine form
of the adjective "definitivo," which meant to a reader at the time
"[d]ícese de lo que decide, resuelve o concluye": a term used to
describe that which decides, resolves or concludes [a matter]. Diccionario
de la Lengua Castellana por la Real Academia Española 329 (Decimocuarta ed.
1914). A contemporaneous
Spanishto- English dictionary translated "definitivo" as (not
surprisingly) "definitive" or "determinate." A New
Pronouncing Dictionary of the Spanish and English Languages 209 (1908). At the
time, "definitive" was understood primarily to mean
"[d]eterminate; positive; final; conclusive; unconditional; express."
Webster’s at 382.
Similarly,
"determinate" was defined as "[h]aving defined limits; not
uncertain or arbitrary; fixed; established; definite[;] [c]onclusive; decisive;
positive." Id. at 401.
Although
a temporal sense could be squeezed out of those definitions, their most natural
meaning is that the issue of sovereignty was decided, resolved, or concluded in
favor of Cuba.
(ii)
Other Terms of the Lease Suggest That Cuba Retains Sovereignty Over Guantanamo.
Other
provisions of the Lease demonstrate that Cuba currently enjoys sovereignty over
Guantanamo. Article III of the Lease states that Cuba consents to the United
States’ exercise of jurisdiction and control over Guantanamo "during the
period of the occupation" by the United States. The 1913 Webster’s
dictionary defines "occupation" (in relevant part) as "1. The act
or process of occupying or taking possession; actual possession and control; the
state of being occupied; a holding or keeping; tenure; use; as, the occupation
of lands by a tenant." Webster’s at 994. Thus, the United States, as an
"occupier," enjoys the status of a tenant rather than a landlord.
Indeed,
it would be odd for a sovereign to be described as "occupying" its own
lands; instead, the term usually means the exercise of control by one nation
over the sovereign territory of another.
Additionally,
if the United States were a true sovereign, it could permissibly do many things
at Guantanamo that it is not entitled to do. For instance, the United States may
not permissibly change the use of the land (say, by raising commercial crops);5
if the United States were sovereign, it could raise commercial crops. If the
property is abandoned, the lease ends automatically;6
if the United States were sovereign, it could allow the land to lie idle without
jeopardizing its sovereignty and its concomitant right to use the property
later. Cuban trade vessels must be allowed free passage;7
if the United States were sovereign, it could choose to refuse passage to
another nation’s vessels for economic, political, or other reasons. The United
States pays rent; if it were sovereign, it would have the legal right to use the
land without paying another sovereign state annually for the privilege. The
United States never has enjoyed these rights because Cuba, as sovereign, never
relinquished them.
The
majority asserts that the United States has repeatedly breached the terms of the
Lease by using Guantanamo other than as a naval base and coaling station. Maj.
op. at 34.8 The majority then reasons that
sovereignty is demonstrated by the United States’ repeated violations of the
Lease. Maj. op. at 34-40. That conclusion does not follow.
The
fact that Cuba lacks the political or military might necessary to hold the
United States responsible for breaching the Lease does not mean that the United
States has not breached the Lease or that the Lease has ceased to exist.9
The ability to violate terms of an agreement with impunity does not render a
party legally free to ignore the agreement. It means only that the party in
breach is spared the practical consequences of its improper acts. If a celebrity
tenant breaches his lease by keeping unauthorized pets, and the landlord feels
that she can do nothing about it, the tenant does not thereby become the owner
of the house. Indeed, the landlord may not even have waived the right to enforce
the no-pet term of the lease later. Rather, the tenant is in breach of the lease
but escapes the attendant consequences.
Similarly,
even if the United States has violated the Lease, it simply is big enough and
strong enough that Cuba has been unable to enforce its legal entitlements.
This
difference in power does not erase the United States’ obligations under the
Lease, nor does it mean that Guantanamo is a part of the sovereign territory of
the United States. The Lease is actually a lease, albeit a highly unusual one
with a very pushy tenant.
As
is the case with most leases, the tenant has a right of quiet enjoyment during
the lease term. The owner—even though "ultimate" ownership
"continues" during the term of the lease—gives up jurisdiction and
control over the property with whatever limits are agreed by the parties to the
lease. That is just what happened here. Even a life tenancy or an option to buy
does not convey fee simple ownership to the tenant.
b.
The Hay-Bunau-Varilla Treaty The majority seeks to bolster its conclusion that
Guantanamo is part of the sovereign territory of the United States by referring
to the 1904 Hay-Bunau-Varilla Treaty ("Panama Canal Treaty"), which
authorized construction of the Panama Canal.
Maj.
op. at 40-45. An examination of the Panama Canal Treaty actually weakens the
majority’s case, however.
The
Attorney General’s Opinion explained that, in the view of the executive
branch:
Article
3 of the treaty transfers to the United States, not the sovereignty by that
term, but "all the rights, power and authority" within the Zone that
it would have if it were sovereign . . . .
The
omission to use words expressly passing sovereignty was dictated by reasons of
public policy, I assume; but whatever the reason the treaty gives the substance
of sovereignty, and instead of containing a mere declaration transferring the
sovereignty, descends to the particulars "all the rights, power, and
authority" that belong to sovereignty, and negatives any such
"sovereign rights, power, or authority" in the former sovereign.
26
Op. Att’y Gen. 376, 377 (1907). Article III of the Panama Canal Treaty, on
which the Attorney General’s Opinion relied, reads in its entirety:
The
Republic of Panama grants to the United States all the rights, power and
authority within the zone mentioned and described in Article II of this
agreement and within the limits of all auxiliary lands and waters mentioned and
described in said Article II which the United States would possess and exercise
if it were the sovereign of the territory within which said lands and waters are
located to the entire exclusion of the exercise by the Republic of Panama of any
such sovereign rights, power or authority.
Convention
for the Construction of a Ship Canal to Connect the Waters of the Atlantic and
Pacific Oceans, Nov. 18, 1903, U.S.-Panama, art. III, 33 Stat. 2234 (emphasis
added).
The
text of Article III of the Panama Canal Treaty differs from the provisions of
the Guantanamo Lease. The Guantanamo Lease never says that the United States is
granted "all" of the "rights, power and authority" that it
would enjoy "if it were the sovereign." To the contrary, the
Guantanamo Lease mentions the concept of sovereignty in connection with Cuba,
not in connection with the United States. The Guantanamo Lease provides that
"the United States recognizes the continuance of the ultimate sovereignty
of the Republic of Cuba over the above described areas of land and water."
Guantanamo Lease, art. III (emphasis added). There is no similar recognition in
the Panama Canal Treaty.
The
Panama Canal Treaty and the Guantanamo Lease share many similarities, as the
majority points out. But the only question here is whether the United States was
granted sovereignty, and the texts of the documents differ dramatically on this
point.
The
Panama Canal Treaty granted "all the rights, power and authority" of a
"sovereign" to the United States, with no express reservation of
sovereignty to Panama. The Guantanamo Lease is just the opposite; it grants to
the United States the "exercise" of "complete jurisdiction and
control over and within" a designated area, while reserving "the
continuance of the ultimate sovereignty" to Cuba. This distinction in the
texts of the two documents must be deemed intentional and must be given effect.
The Panama Canal Treaty passed sovereignty to the United States, while the
Guantanamo Lease did not.
A
comparison of the provisions of the two documents with respect to eminent
domain, likewise, underscores the differing treatment of sovereignty. In the
Guantanamo Lease, Cuba gives the United States the power of eminent domain; that
is, this is a lease with an option to buy. Guantanamo Lease, art. III. If the
United States were sovereign, this provision would be redundant because, by
definition, a sovereign could exercise the power of eminent domain.
An
examination of the Panama Canal Treaty illustrates this truism. In the Panama
Canal Treaty, Panama gave the United States a similar power of eminent domain,
or a lease with an option to buy, only with respect to areas that were not given
to the United States as its sovereign territory—the cities and harbors of
Panama and Colon. Panama Canal Treaty, arts. II and VII. In the areas as to
which Panama ceded sovereignty, such a clause was unnecessary because the power
of eminent domain is an attribute of sovereignty. But, in both the Guantanamo
Lease and the Panama Canal Treaty, in areas as to which Cuba and Panama
(respectively) retained sovereignty the option to buy had to be granted
specifically as a contractual term.
3.
Separation of Powers One additional point bears mention. The executive branch
has taken the position that "the United States has no claim of sovereignty
over the leased areas" of Guantanamo. Brief for Appellees George W. Bush et
al., filed June 18, 2003, at 17.
Rather,
"Guantanamo Bay Naval Base is located within the sovereign territory of the
Republic of Cuba." Id.
The
Supreme Court has recently reminded us that the Constitution allocates the
foreign relations power to the federal executive in recognition of the
"concern for uniformity in this country’s dealings with foreign
nations." Am. Ins. Ass’n v.
Garamendi,
123 S. Ct. 2374, 2386 (2003) (internal quotation marks omitted).
"‘Although
the source of the President’s power to act in foreign affairs does not enjoy
any textual detail, the historical gloss on the "executive Power"
vested in Article II of the Constitution has recognized the President's
"vast share of responsibility for the conduct of our foreign
relations."’" Id. (quoting Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v.
Sawyer,
343 U.S. 579, 610-11 (1952) (Frankfurter, J., concurring); see also, e.g.,
First Nat’l City Bank v. Banco Nacional de Cuba, 406 U.S. 759, 767 (1972)
(explaining that the President has "the lead role . . . in foreign
policy"); Chi. & S. Air Lines, Inc. v.
Waterman
S.S. Corp., 333 U.S. 103, 109 (1948) (noting the President’s role as the
"Nation’s organ in foreign affairs").
The
majority today declares that the United States has sovereignty over territory of
a foreign state, over the objections of the executive branch. Indeed, both
parties to the Guantanamo Lease and its associated treaties—Cuba and the
United States (through the executive branch)—maintain that Guantanamo is part
of Cuba.
Nevertheless,
the majority announces that the United States has annexed Guantanamo.
In
so doing, the majority "compromise[s] the very capacity of the President to
speak for the Nation with one voice in dealing with other governments."
Crosby v. Nat’l Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363, 381 (2000).
It has created an
inconsistency in our nation’s foreign policy, with one branch (which has
primary responsibility in this field) declaring that the United States is not
sovereign over Guantanamo, and a second branch (which is not politically
accountable) declaring that it is. The complications that flow from such a
situation are as obvious now as they were to the framers, who chose to avoid
them by granting to the President the lead authority in foreign affairs.
Perhaps
in some circumstance, a federal court would be obliged in the execution of its
constitutional duties to declare, over the objections of the executive branch,
that the United States is sovereign over some territory. However, in view of the
constitutional allocation of powers, and the need for the United States to speak
with one voice in dealing with foreign nations, federal courts should tread
lightly.
The
question whether the United States has sovereignty over Guantanamo is undeniably
close. That being so, the issue is particularly sensitive and the declarations
by the executive branch regarding foreign policy should carry significant
weight. The majority’s failure to credit the executive branch’s position on
sovereignty over Guantanamo is an unwise and unwarranted extension of judicial
authority in an arena belonging primarily to the executive branch.
4.
Deferral As noted, the Supreme Court has recently granted certiorari in a
consolidated appeal that provides the Court with an opportunity to consider the
question about which the majority and I disagree. The orders granting certiorari
were limited to this question: "Whether United States courts lack
jurisdiction to consider challenges to the legality of the detention of foreign
nationals captured abroad in connection with hostilities and incarcerated at the
Guantanamo Bay Naval Base, Cuba." I believe that we should wait to hear the
Supreme Court’s answer to that question, because the views that we express
here will become obsolete as soon as the Supreme Court renders its decision.
The
issues that Mr. Gherebi raises are significant and troubling. Under existing
Supreme Court precedent, however, I do not believe that we have jurisdiction to
reach them.10 There are good arguments that can
(and undoubtedly will) be made in support of the proposition that federal courts
should have the power to hear habeas petitions of prisoners held by officers of
the United States government, whatever the prisoners’ nationality and whatever
their situs of imprisonment. If the Supreme Court is persuaded by those
arguments to modify or overrule Johnson, I look forward to reaching the merits
of this case. But until the Supreme Court speaks, nothing that the majority or I
say can have any legal effect. Our decision is, in a practical sense, advisory.
I therefore believe that we should defer submission until the Supreme Court
decides Rasul and Al Odah.
5.
Conclusion It is of grave concern when federal courts, traditionally the
guardians of our Constitution and our liberties, turn away claims that
government officials have violated an individual’s rights. I am reluctant, as
was the district court, to hold that the court lacked jurisdiction over Mr.
Gherebi’s petition for habeas corpus, and my view should not be mistaken for
approval either of Mr. Gherebi’s detention or of the precedent that prevents
us from scrutinizing it. But I am equally reluctant to distort treaties, leases,
and Supreme Court cases to reach a more desirable outcome. Change in the law, if
any there will be, must come from the Supreme Court. Failing that, a remedy, if
any there will be, must come from Congress and the executive branch.
Accordingly,
and regrettably, I dissent.
Notas:
*
The Honorable Milton I. Shadur, Senior United States District Judge for the
Northern District of Illinois, sitting by designation.
1For
convenience, we sometimes refer to Guantanamo Naval Base as “Guantanamo” and
sometimes simply as “the Base.”
2Although
there is a dearth of official reports as to the conditions at Guantanamo, there
have been a number of newspaper stories reporting on the subject, including
interviews with Afghani and Pakistani citizens released without the filing of
charges. Some of the prisoners released have said that the uncertainty of their
fate, combined with linguistic isolation from others with whom they could
communicate, confinement in very small cells, little protection from the
elements, and being allowed only one one-minute shower per week led a number of
detainees to attempt suicide multiple times. See Carlotta Gall & Neil
A. Lewis, Threats and Responses: Captives; Tales of Despair from Guantanamo,
N.Y. TIMES, June 17, 2003, at A1; see also Neil A. Lewis, Red Cross
Criticizes Indefinite Detention in Guantanamo, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 10, 2003, at
A1 (reporting that in 18 months, 21 detainees have made 32 suicide attempts, a
high incidence which human rights groups attribute to the uncertainty of their
situation).
3See
Neil A. Lewis,U.S.
Erecting a Solid Prison at Guantanamo for Long Term, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 23,
2003, at A20 (discussing the building of a hard-walled traditional prison as an
acknowledgment that detainees from Afghanistan will be kept for years).
4From
here on, “Gherebi” refers to the detainee, Faren Gherebi, rather than to his
brother and next friend, Belaid.
5The
Petition read, in relevant part:
2.
Beginning on or about January 11, 2002, and continuing to date, respondents
under force of arms and involuntary brought to U.S. Naval Station, Guantanamo
Bay, Cuba (hereinafter “GITMO”), under the exclusive and complete
jurisdiction of respondents in the nation of Cuba, Gheredi, whom respondents
captured in the nation of Afghantisan.
3.
Gherebi continues to be held against his will, illegally, under force of arms,
incommunicado, and in violation of the United States Constitution and the Third
Geneva Convention, and he has been denied access to legal representatives.
4.
Respondents have characterized Gherebi as an “unlawful combatant,” and have
denied him status as a prisoner of war, have denied him rights under the United
States Constitution, and have denied him access to the United States Courts.
5.
Gherebi is unlawfully detained.
6.
Respondents are the persons who have illegal and exclusive custody of Gherebi.
6In
a memorandum filed with this Court, Gherebi stated:
What
is sought by this petition is: acknowledgment that Gherebi is detained by
respondents; that the reason for Gherebi’s detention be stated; that Gherebi
be brought physically before the court for a determination of his conditions of
detention, confinement, and status, which conditions are contended to be in
violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments and
the cruel and unusual punishment clause of the Eighth Amendment, and be ordered
to be brought into compliance with those Amendments; that Gherebi be accorded
his right under the Sixth Amendment of equal access to counsel; that Gherebi be
released; and for any and all appropriate other and further action.
7Gherebi
argues that the government’s policy of “indefinite detention” is violative
of international law. While we recognize the gravity of Gherebi’s argument, we
need not resolve that question in this proceeding. We note, however, that the
government’s position here is at odds with the United States’ longtime role
as a leader in international efforts to codify and safeguard the rights of
prisoners in wartime. It is also at odds with one of the most important
achievements of these efforts–the 1949 Geneva Conventions, which require that
a competent tribunal determine the status of captured prisoners. Article 5 of
the Third Geneva Convention provides:
Should
any doubt arise as to whether persons, having committed a belligerent act and
having fallen into the hands of the enemy, belong to any of the categories
enumerated in Article 4 [defining POWs], such persons shall enjoy the protection
of the present Convention until such time as their status has been determined by
a competent tribunal.
Geneva
Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, Aug. 12, 1949, art. 5,
6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135. In Johnson v. Eisentrager, itself, the
Court discussed the United States’ international obligations under the
predecessor Convention, which did not even contain the due process rights
afforded prisoners of war in the 1949 Treaty. The Court explained:
We
are not holding that these prisoners have no right which the military
authorities are bound to respect. The United States, by the Geneva Convention of
July 27, 1927...concluded with fortysix other countries, including the German
Reich, an agreement upon the treatment to be accorded captives. These prisoners
claim to be and are entitled to its protection.
339
U.S. at 789 n.14. The government’s own regulations have adopted this same
requirement. See Enemy Prisoners of War, Retained Personnel, Civilian
Internees and Other Detainees, U.S. Army Regulation 190-8, ch. 1-5, ¶ a,
Applicable to the Departments of the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, and the
Marine Corps, Washington D.C. (Oct. 1, 1997) (“All persons taken into custody
by U.S. forces will be provided with the protections of the 1949 Geneva
Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War (“GPW”) until some
legal status is determined by competent authority.”). The requirement of
judicial review of executive detention is also reflected in the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, to which the United States is a party. See
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, 999
U.N.T.S. 171, art. 9, ¶ 4 (“Anyone who is deprived of his liberty by arrest
or detention shall be entitled to take proceedings before a court, in order that
a court may decide without delay on the lawfulness of his detention....”).
Here,
however, the government has maintained that the Guantanamo detainees do not
enjoy any substantive protections as a matter of right pursuant to our
international obligations; instead, it has asserted only that it will apply
“the principles” of the Third Geneva Convention “to the extent appropriate
and consistent with military necessity.” Office of the Press Secretary, Fact
Sheet, Status of Detainees at Guantanamo, Feb. 7, 2002, at 1, at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/02/20020207-13.html.
8Although
the Court discussed the question whether certain Fifth Amendment rights were
available to enemy soldiers (and stated that they were not), the essence of its
holding is as set forth above. Certainly, the government construes Johnson as
foreclosing the right of enemy aliens to file habeas petitions in cases in which
there is no relevant connection with U.S. territorial jurisdiction or
sovereignty, as the case may be. We accept that construction for purposes of
this appeal. We also believe it to be the most reasonable construction of the
Court’s decision. Whether that decision should stand is, of course, a matter
for the Supreme Court and not for us.
9The
United States occupies Guantanamo under a lease entered into by President
Theodore Roosevelt with the Cuban government in 1903, supplemented by a 1903
agreement, and continued in effect by a subsequent treaty executed by President
Franklin Delano Roosevelt in 1934. The treaty is of indefinite duration and
cannot be terminated without the United States’ agreement, or the abandonment
of the base property by the United States.
The
1903 Lease was meant to implement the provisions of Article VII of a 1901 Act of
Congress (and of Article VII of the Appendix to the Constitution of Cuba) (the
“Platt Amendment”) providing for the sale or lease of land to the U.S. for
coaling or naval stations “to enable the United States to maintain the
independence of Cuba, and to protect the people thereof, as well as for its own
defense” following the Spanish-American War. See Agreement Between the
United States and Cuba for the Lease of Lands for Coaling and Naval Stations,
Feb. 16-23, 1903, U.S.-Cuba, T.S. 418 (excerpting Article VII and explaining
this purpose) [hereinafter “the 1903 Lease”]. Article III of the Lease
reads, in pertinent part:
While
on the one hand the United States recognizes the continuance of the ultimate
sovereignty of the Republic of Cuba over the above described areas of land
and water, on the other hand the Republic of Cuba consents that during the
period of the occupation by the United States of said areas under the terms of
this agreement the United States shall exercise complete jurisdiction and
control over and within said areas with the right to acquire...for the
public purposes of the United States any land or other property therein by
purchase or by exercise of eminent domain with full compensation to the owners
thereof.
Id.,
art. III (emphasis added).
Under
a supplementary agreement, the United States was afforded the exclusive right to
try citizens and non-citizens for crimes committed on the Base.
Article
IV reads, in relevant part:
Fugitives
from justice charged with crimes or misdemeanors amenable to Cuban Law, taking
refuge within said areas, shall be delivered up by the United States authorities
on demand by duly authorized Cuban authorities.
On
the other hand, the Republic of Cuba agrees that fugitives from justice charged
with crimes or misdemeanors amenable to United States law, committed within said
areas, taking refuge in Cuban territory, shall on demand, be delivered up to
duly authorized United States authorities.
See
Lease
of Certain Areas for Naval or Coaling Stations, July 2, 1903, U.S.–Cuba, art.
IV, T.S. No. 426 (emphasis added) [hereinafter “the 1903 Supplemental
Agreement”]. Under Article I of the same, the U.S. agreed to pay Cuba the
annual sum of two thousand dollars in rent, see id., art. I; and under
Article III, the United States agreed to a limit on establishing commercial or
industrial enterprises on the lands. Id., art. III.
A
1934 treaty reaffirmed the original 1903 agreements, extending the Lease in the
same form and on the same conditions “[s]o long as the United States of
America shall not abandon the said naval station of Guantanamo” and the two
contracting parties do not “agree to the modification or abrogation of the
stipulations of the agreement.” Treaty Defining Relations with Cuba, May 29,
1934, U.S.–Cuba, art. III, 48 Stat. 1682, 1683, T.S. No. 866.
10
There was no lease or treaty conveying total and exclusive U.S. jurisdiction and
control over Landsberg. In fact, after Landsberg was taken over by U.S. forces
following World War II, three flags flew over the town: the American, British,
and French flags. See History
of Landsberg Airbase,
http://www.furstytreemovers-landsbergbavarians.org/history_of_landsberg.htm
(last visited Nov. 10, 2003). Although the Johnson petitioners were held
pursuant to conviction by proceedings conducted under U.S. auspices, the
Landsberg criminal facility was formally designated with the purpose of serving
as a prison where executions of war criminals convicted during the Allied trials
at Nuremberg, Dachau and Shanghi would be carried out, and the arrangement was
dissolved a little more than a decade thereafter, in May 1958. See Landsberg
Prison for War Criminals,
http://www.buergervereinigung-landsberg.org/english/warcriminals/warcriminals.sh
tml (last visited at Nov. 10, 2003). That the named respondents in Johnson–the
Secretary of Defense, Secretary of the Army, Chief of Staff of the Army, and the
Joint Chiefs of Staff–denied that petitioner’s immediate custodian, the
Commanding General of the European Command, “was subject to their
direction,” is telling of the less-than-exclusive nature of U.S. control over
the prison. Johnson, 339 U.S. at 766-68.
11The
Court spoke to the issue of the extraterritorial situs of petitioners in eight
instances in the opinion; at only two of these points does the term
“sovereign” or “sovereignty” appear. See, e.g., 339 U.S. at 768
(“We are cited to no instance where a court, in this or any other country
where the writ is known, has issued it on behalf of an alien enemy who, at no
relevant time and in no stage of his captivity, has been within its territorial
jurisdiction.”) (emphasis added); id. at 771 (“But in extending
constitutional protections beyond the citizenry, the Court has been at pains to
point out that it was the alien’s presence within its territorial
jurisdiction that gave the Judiciary power to act.”) (emphasis added).
Moreover, the dissent never uses the word “sovereignty” and strongly
criticizes the majority for making “territorial jurisdiction” the touchstone
of the jurisdictional inquiry. See id. at 952 (Black, J., dissenting)
(“Conceivably a majority may hereafter find citizenship a sufficient
substitute for territorial jurisdiction and thus permit courts to protect
Americans from illegal sentences. But the Court’s opinion inescapably denies
courts power to afford the least bit of protection for any alien who is subject
to our occupation government abroad, even if he is neither enemy nor belligerent
and even after peace is officially declared.”) (emphasis added).
12At
least two Justices of the current Court appear to agree. See Zadvydas v.
Davis,
533 U.S. 678, 704 n.* (2001) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (stating, in a dissent
joined by Justice Thomas, that Johnson involved the “military’s
detention of enemy aliens outside the territorial jurisdiction of the
United States”) (emphasis added).
That
Johnson should not be read to foreclose jurisdiction where the United
States exercises exclusive authority and control is bolstered by Justice
Jackson’s own dissent several years later in Shaughnessy v. U.S. ex. rel.
Mezei, 345 U.S. 209, 218 (1953), in which the author of the Johnson majority
opinion expressed strong views about the requisites of procedural due process
where an alien was detained indefinitely on a unique parcel of U.S. territory,
“in his temporary haven on Ellis Island.” Id. at 207. In Shaughnessy,
an alien immigrant permanently excluded from the United States on security
grounds, and functionally detained indefinitely on Ellis Island because other
countries would not take him back, petitioned for habeas corpus asserting
unlawful confinement. The majority treated his case like a regular exclusion
proceeding, and denied Mezei’s petition. In vigorous dissent, Justice Jackson
wrote:
Fortunately,
it is still startling, in this country, to find a person held indefinitely in
executive custody without accusation of a crime or judicial trial...Procedural
fairness and regularity are of the indispensable essence of liberty...Because
the respondent has no right of entry, does it follow that he has no rights at
all? Does the power to exclude mean that exclusion may be continued or
effectuated by any means which happen to seem appropriate to the
authorities?...when indefinite confinement becomes the means of enforcing
exclusion, it seems to me that due process requires that the alien be informed
of its grounds and have a fair chance to overcome them...It is inconceivable to
me that this measure of simple justice and fair dealing would menace the
security of this country. No one can make me believe that we are that far gone.
Id.
at
632-37. Although the legal status of Guantanamo is not as clear-cut as that of
Ellis Island, the eloquent words of Johnson’s author carry a powerful
message for the present case and caution strongly against a narrow reading of
his earlier decision.
13
For example, in United States v. Rogers, 388 F. Supp. 298, 301 (E.D. Va.
1975), a U.S. civilian employee, working on the Naval Base at Guantanamo Bay
under a contract with the Navy, was prosecuted in the Eastern District of
Virginia for drug offenses committed on the Base in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§
841, 846. In considering Rogers’ motion to suppress and Fourth Amendment
claim, the court reasoned:
By
the lease, Cuba agreed that the United States should have complete control over
criminal matters occurring within the confines of the base. It is clear to us
that under the leasing agreement, United States law is to apply.
Id.
See also United States v. Lee,
906 F.2d 117, 117 & n.1 (4th Cir. 1990) (per curiam) (appeal from dismissal
of indictment of Jamaican national who had been charged with sexual abuse that
allegedly occurred on Guantanamo. The government served subpoenas on all defense
witnesses and transported them to Norfolk, Virginia, the site of the trial.); Haitian
Ctrs. Council Inc. v. McNary, 969 F.2d 1326, 1342 (2d Cir. 1992), vacated
as moot sub. nom. Sale v. Haitian Ctrs. Council,
Inc., 509 U.S.
918 (1993) (describing testimony, in the context of this Second Circuit trial,
consistent with applying U.S. criminal law to citizens and noncitizens accused
of crimes on the Base).
14In
Al Odah v. United States, 321 F.3d 1134 (D.C. Cir. 2003), cert.
granted, 2003 WL 22070725 (Nov. 10, 2003), the only other Court of Appeals
decision to consider the question presented here, the DC Circuit rejected
petitioners’ arguments that Johnson “does not turn on technical
definitions of sovereignty or territory,” and opined that the text of the
leases shows that Cuba–not the United States–has sovereignty over
Guantanamo. 321 F.3d at 1142-43. In so holding, the DC Circuit relied in part on
Cuban Am. Bar Ass’n v. Christopher, 43 F.3d 1412 (11th Cir. 1995), in
which the Eleventh Circuit rejected the argument that “‘control and
jurisdiction’ is equivalent to sovereignty,” id. at 1425, to find
that Cuban and Haitian migrants interdicted on the seas and detained outside the
physical borders of the United States at Guantanamo were without constitutional
and statutory rights cognizable in the courts of the United States.
The
Second Circuit, however, expressed a contrary view three years before Cuban
American. In Haitian Ctrs., 969 F.2d at 1341-45, the Second Circuit
affirmed a preliminary injunction prohibiting the government from returning to
Haiti Haitian nationals interdicted at sea and detained at Guantanamo in the
absence of a fair adjudication as to whether they were bonafide asylees. In its
opinion, the court expressly distinguished Johnson, noting that Johnson,
“which involved convicted, enemy aliens in occupied territories outside the
United States,” does not resolve the question of whether “the fifth
amendment applies to non-accused, nonhostile aliens held incommunicado on a
military base within the exclusive control of the United States, namely
Guantanamo Bay.” 969 F.2d at 1343. The Second Circuit further explained:
It
does not appear to us to be incongruous or overreaching to conclude that the
United States Constitution limits the conduct of United States personnel with
respect to officially authorized interactions with aliens brought to and
detained by such personnel on a land mass exclusively controlled by the United
States...given the undisputed applicability of federal criminal laws to
incidents that occur there and the apparent familiarity of the governmental
personnel at the base with the guarantees of due process, fundamental fairness
and humane treatment which this country purports to afford to all persons.
Id.
Although
Haitian Centers was subsequently vacated as moot pursuant to party
settlement, see Sale v. Haitian Ctrs. Council, Inc., 509 U.S. 918 (1993),
we find the Second Circuit’s views to be persuasive, see Edwards v. Madigan,
281 F.2d 73, 78 n.3 (9th Cir. 1960), and have, in fact, recently cited this case
with approval. See Corey, 232 F.3d at 1172.
15A
former Commander of the Base has expressed the same view of U.S. sovereign
authority in Guantanamo in his history of the Naval Base, posted on the U.S.
Navy’s official website. He writes:
[T]he
U.S. has recognized “the continuance of the ultimate sovereignty of Cuba over
and above the leased areas.” “Ultimate,” meaning final or eventual, is a
key word here. It is interpreted that Cuban
sovereignty is interrupted during the period of our occupancy, since we exercise
complete jurisdiction and control, but in the case occupation were terminated,
the area would revert to the ultimate sovereignty of Cuba.
THE
HISTORY OF GUANTANAMO BAY, vol. I, ch. III, at http://www.nsgtmo.navy.mil/gazette/History_98-64/hischp3.htm
(last
visited Nov. 10, 2003).
16The
government also argues that the definition of this pivotal term in the Spanish
version of the Treaty (soberania “definitiva”) lends support for a
qualitative construction of “ultimate.” The government defines “definitiva”
as “que no admite cambios” or “not subject to change,” and then
contends, relying on U.S. v. Percheman, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 51, 88 (1833),
that “‘ultimate’ itself is more naturally defined in this context as
‘basic, fundamental, original, primitive.’” It is this definition, the
government argues, that best comports with Percheman’s doctrine that
“if the English and Spanish parts can, without violence, be made to agree,
that construction which establishes this conformity ought to prevail.” 32 U.S.
at 88.
The
government’s construction inverts the conclusion that the Percheman doctrine
compels. In fact, the Spanish definition of this pivotal term offers further
support for a temporal construction of “ultimate.” “Definitiva”
can mean either 1) final; that which concludes (“temporal”) or 2)
decisive (“qualitative”), but even where “definitiva” is defined
in qualitative terms, it always has a temporal element.
For
example, the authoritative dictionary of the Spanish language defines “definitiva”
in both temporal and qualitative terms as “que decide, resuelve o concluye,”
or “that which decides, resolves, or concludes” (emphasis added). See
REAL ACADEMIA ESPANOLA, at http://www.rae.es/
(last
visited Nov. 10, 2003). To illustrate a common usage of the term, this
dictionary then offers the oft-cited mixed “temporal”/
“qualitative” example of “sentencia definitiva” or “final
judgment of conviction”–a judgment that is both final and decisive;
a judgment that is both last in time and that constitutes the dispositive order.
Id.; see also GRAN DICCIONARIO LAROUSSE 214 (2002) (giving as an example
for “definitiva” another mixed “temporal”/”qualitative”
example, “El proyecto definitivo,” translated as “the final
plan.”). Other Spanish dictionaries confirm that “definitiva” is
subject to both temporal and qualitative meanings, see, e.g., DICCIONARIO
VOX, at http://www.diccionarios.com
(last
visited Nov. 10, 2003) (defining “definitiva” as “que decide o
concluye,” or, “that which decides or concludes”), and Spanish-
English dictionaries also support a dual temporal/qualitative definition. See
LAROUSSE DICTIONARY 84 (1989) (defining “definitiva” in English
as “definitive; final”); AMERICAN HERITAGE SPANISH DICTIONARY, at http://education.yahoo.com/reference/dict_en_es/
(last
visited Nov. 10, 2003) (same). Thus, under Percheman’s doctrine, the
analysis is formulaic and the answer evident: because the English word
“ultimate” is principally defined in temporal terms, and the Spanish term
“definitiva” is susceptible to either temporal or qualitative
definitions, or a mixed definition, it is the temporal definition that prevails.
17
The division or sharing of sovereignty is commonplace. Sovereignty “is not an
indivisible whole[.]” WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL 2179 (defining
“sovereignty”). See also Jones v. U.S., 137 U.S. 202, 212 (1890)
(recognizing a distinction between de jure and de facto sovereignty).
18To
the extent that the Lease purported to limit the types of activities the U.S.
may conduct, that particular aspect of the agreement lost any and all practical
and legal significance when the U.S. ceased to recognize Cuba diplomatically in
1961, and began thereafter to act in direct contravention of the terms of the
agreement, up to and including the present use of Guantanamo as a prisoner of
war camp for suspected Taliban fighters. See infra Part II(A)(3). In any
event, even while effective, the limitation did not curtail the United States’
exclusive authority and control over the Base, serve to reserve qualitative
sovereignty to Cuba during the period of U.S. occupation, or afford any rights
to Cuba to exercise any jurisdiction during the unlimited period of U.S.
dominion and control. See, e.g., 29 Op. Att’y Gen. 269, 270-71 (1911)
(“[W]hen property is acquired by one state in another state by virtue of a
treaty, any sovereignty which may attach to the property so acquired is limited
by the terms on which, and the purposes for which, the property was
acquired...There seems to be nothing in reason or in law which prohibits such a
situation.”).
19In
a January 11, 2002 statement issued to the international community as the
detainees were arriving at Guantanamo, the Cuban government lamented the unfair
conditions imposed by the Treaty and its powerlessness to stop U.S.
transgressions.
The
Statement reads, in part:
[T]hroughout
more than four decades, that base has been put to multiple uses, none of them
contemplated in the agreement that justified its presence in our territory. But
Cuba could do absolutely nothing to prevent it[.]
Statement by the
Government of Cuba to the National and International Public Opinion, at http://ciponline.org/cuba/cubaproject/cubanstatement.htm.
20
The U.S. Navy’s official website explains:
In
1991, the naval base’s mission expanded as some 34,000 Haitian refugees passed
through Guantanamo Bay...In May 1994, Operation Sea Signal began and the naval
base was tasked to support Joint Task Force 160, here providing humanitarian
assistance to thousands of Haitian and Cuban migrants...Since Sea Signal,
Guantanamo Bay has retained a migrant operations mission with a steady state
migrant population of less than 30.
The
base has also conducted two contingency migrant operations: Operation Marathon
in October 1996 and Present Haven in February 1997. Both of these short-fused
events involved the interception of Chinese migrants being smuggled into the
United States.
Guantanamo
Bay, A Brief History, at http://www.nsgtmo.navy.mil/Default.htm
(last
visited Nov. 10, 2003).
21Black’s
Law Dictionary defines
sovereignty, in pertinent part, as:
The
supreme, absolute, and uncontrollable power by which any independent state is
governed; supreme political authority; the supreme will...The power to do
everything in a state without accountability...It is the supreme power by
which any citizen is governed and is the person or body of persons in the state
to whom there is politically no superior. By sovereignty in its largest sense is
meant supreme, absolute, uncontrollable power...the word by itself comes nearest
to being the definition of “sovereignty” is will or volition as applied to
political affairs.
BLACK’S
LAW DICTIONARY1396 (emphasis added).
Similarly,
Webster’s Third International defines sovereignty, in relevant part,
as:
(2)(a)(1):
supreme power, esp. over a body politic: dominion, sway (a) freedom from
external control: autonomy, independence...
(c)controlling
influence WEBSTER’S THIRD INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 2179 (emphasis added).
22The
Guantanamo Lease was signed by the President of Cuba on February 16, 1903 and
President Theodore Roosevelt on February 23, 1903. The Canal Zone Treaty was
concluded on November 18, 1903, and was subsequently signed by President
Roosevelt and ratified by the Senate in February 1904 before being proclaimed on
February 25, 1904.
23Like
the 1903 Lease agreements and continuing Treaty governing the terms of U.S.
control over Guantanamo, supra note 9, Article II of the Convention for
the Construction of a Ship Canal (Hay-Bunau-Varilla Treaty) cedes to the U.S.
without temporal limitation all power and authority over the Zone. In the case
of the Canal Zone, the purpose was “for the construction, maintenance,
operation, sanitation and protection of said Canal.” Convention for the
Construction of a Ship Canal to Connect the Waters of the Atlantic and Pacific
Oceans, Nov. 18, 1903, U.S.- Panama, art. II, 33 Stat. 2234, T.S. 431. Article
XIV provides for, inter alia, the annual payment during the life of the
Convention of two hundred and fifty thousand dollars. Id., art. XIV. Cf.
1903 Supplemental Agreement, supra note 9, art. I (providing for the
lease payment to Cuba).
Similar
to Article III of the 1903 Guantanamo Lease, Article III of the Canal Zone
Convention further provides:
The
Republic of Panama grants to the United States all the rights, power, and
authority within the zone mentioned and described in Article II of this
agreement and within the limits of all auxiliary lands and waters mentioned and
described in said Article II which the United States would possess and exercise
if it were the sovereign of the territory within which said lands and waters are
located to the entire exclusion of the exercise by the Republic of Panama of any
such rights, power, or authority.
Id.,
art. III. Moreover, like Article III of the 1903 Guantanamo Lease, supra note
9, Article VII goes on to provide the U.S. with “the right to acquire by
purchase or by the exercise of the right of eminent domain, any lands,
buildings, water rights or other properties necessary and convenient for the
construction , maintenance, operation and protection of the Canal and of any
works of sanitation[.]” Id., art.
VII.
Under
a subsequent treaty executed in 1939 by the same President that signed the 1934
continuing Treaty with Cuba, President Franklin Delano Roosevelt, the U.S.
agreed to additional terms that, inter alia, limited business enterprises
in the Canal Zone to those directly connected with the canal (and a limited
number of truck farmers who had established their farms prior to the treaty).
General Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation Between the United States of
America and Panama, March 2, 1939, U.S.-Panama, 53 Stat. 1807, T.S. No. 945. Cf.
1903 Supplemental Agreement, supra note 9, art. III (limiting
commercial and industrial enterprises on the Guantanamo Base). At the same time,
Article XI of the 1939 Treaty preserved the respective rights and obligations of
the parties under the original 1903 agreement including, in the case of the
U.S., all the rights that ordinarily pertain to sovereignty. Cf. Treaty
Defining Relations with Cuba, supra note 9, art. III (continuing the 1903
lease agreements governing the Guantanamo Base).
24The
U.S. did, in fact, return the Canal Zone to Panama in December 1999, after years
of protests by Panamanians over the unfairness of the 1903 Treaty and its
cession of Panamanian territory to the United States. See Panama Canal
Treaty, Sept. 7, 1977, U.S.–Panama, 33 U.S.T. 47 (establishing the basis for
the 1999 retransfer).
25
The government places much reliance on comments volunteered in the Court’s
opinion in Vermilya-Brown v. Connell, 335 U.S. 377 (1948), a case in
which the Court held that the Fair Labor Standards Act applies to work performed
on territory in Bermuda leased for use as a military base for a finite term of
99 years. See Agreement and Exchanges of Notes Between the United States
of America and Great Britain Respecting Leased Naval and Air Bases, Mar. 27,
1941, U.S.–Great Britain, 55 Stat. 1560, E.A.S. No. 235. In Vermilya-Brown,
after accepting, for purposes of the opinion, the Secretary of State’s view
that the U.S. did not
obtain sovereignty over the territory in Bermuda, the Court likened the Bermuda
lease to the agreements entered into with Cuba and Panama. The Court in Vermilya-Brown
had no occasion to rule on the legal status of either the Cuban or
Panamanian agreements, and its comments regarding their similarity to the
Bermuda lease were not material to its discussion. The Court was construing the
term “territory or possession of the United States” as used in the Act, and
afforded it a broad sweep covering territory over which the U.S. exercised
sovereign jurisdiction as well as territory over which it did not. Its holding
was that the FLSA applied in Bermuda, as it did in Guantanamo and the Canal
Zone. Viewed in this light, we do not believe that the Court would consider its
observations regarding the similarity of the various agreements to constitute a
determination of a fundamental issue of law dispositive of important
constitutional rights. Nor do we believe that it would expect the lower courts
to treat them as such.
26Crimes
on the base involving military personnel are typically handled by a U.S.
Navy-Marine Corps Court. See, e.g., U.S. v. Elmore, 56 MJ 533 (2001)
(Court of Criminal Appeals); U.S. v. Bobroff, 23 MJ 872 (1987) (Court of
Military Review). Base commanders are required to hold for civil authorities any
person not subject to the Uniform Code of Military Justice who is suspected of
criminal activity. See Rogers, 388 F. Supp. at 301 (discussing Navy
Regulations (1973, Section 0713)).
27See,
e.g., American
College of Trial Lawyers, REPORT ON MILITARY COMMISSIONS FOR THE TRIAL OF
TERRORISTS 8 (Mar. 2003)(“[T]he placement of the detainees at Guantanamo,
w[as] carefully designed to evade judicial scrutiny and to test the limits of
the President’s constitutional authority.”).
28
Gherebi names Secretary Rumsfeld, as well as President Bush and other military
and civilian officials, as respondents. The government asserts that the proper
respondents in the instant case are at the Pentagon, and therefore that the only
court that has territorial jurisdiction over the appropriate custodians is the
U.S.
District
Court for the Eastern District of Virginia. The government has not, however,
moved to dismiss the petition against respondents other than Secretary Rumsfeld.
Nor do they contend that the appropriate respondent is the “immediate
custodian” rather than the “ultimate custodian.” See, e.g., Sanders v.
Bennett, 148 F.2d 19, 20 (D.C. Cir. 1945); Monk v. Sec’y of the Navy,
793 F.2d 364 (D.C. Cir. 1986).
We
agree that the proper custodian is Secretary Rumsfeld. See, e.g., Armentero
v. INS, 340 F.3d 1058, 1063 (9th Cir. 2003) (holding that the “most
appropriate respondent to petitions brought by immigration detainees is the
individual in charge of the national government agency under whose auspices the
alien is detained”). While it was the President who directed the Department of
Defense to conduct the military operations in Afghanistan, it is the Defense
Department rather than the White House that will decide (at least in form)
whether Gherebi is released from Guantanamo. It is also the Defense Department
that maintains the Base and has custody over all prisoners. Because the
appropriate individual respondent is the head of the national government agency
under whose auspices the alien is detained, Donald Rumsfeld is the appropriate
respondent in this proceeding. We also note that this Court’s power to direct
the President to perform an official act raises constitutional questions easily
avoided by naming the Secretary alone. See Franklin v. Massachusetts, 505
U.S. 788 (1992). Accordingly, we conduct our analysis as if the Secretary were
the single named respondent in this case.
29For
an analysis of personal jurisdiction under California law, see generally Doe
v. Unocal Corp., 248 F.3d 915 (9th Cir. 2001), reh’g en banc granted
and opinion vacated by Doe v. Unocal Corp., 2003 WL 359787 (9th Cir. 2003).
30In
fact, it was only in a footnote that the government urged that the case be
transferred, and then only for want of jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §
1631. While we reject that argument on the basis of our holding that
jurisdiction lies in the Central District, the question of transfer pursuant to
28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) presents a distinct issue. Neither party has addressed this
question, nor has the government filed a motion to transfer in connection
therewith. Thus, it is only because of the unique circumstances surrounding this
appeal that we mention the issue, although we do not resolve it here.
31Under
28 U.S.C. § 1406(a), if a case is filed in the wrong district, a
district court “shall dismiss, or if it be in the interest of justice,
transfer such case to any district or division in which it could have been
brought.” See King v. Russell, 963 F.2d 1301, 1303-04 (9th Cir. 1992).
32For
example, both the habeas movant and his counsel are located in California, see
Gulf Oil, 330 U.S. at 509 (location of movant a factor to consider);
Padilla
v. Rumsfeld,
233 F. Supp.2d 564, 587 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (location of counsel a factor to
consider), and because the Central District court is already familiar with the
case, transfer may lead to delay. CFTC v. Savage, 611 F.2d 270, 279 (9th
Cir. 1979). Further, neither of the two “particularly important” factors
bearing on convenience and venue in alien habeas cases appear to weigh in favor
of transfer in this case: on the one hand, there is a legitimate concern that
transfer of Guantanamo detainees’ individual petitions to the Eastern District
of Virginia could flood the jurisdiction “beyond the capability of the
district court to process in a timely fashion,” see Henderson, 157 F.3d
at 127; Strait, 406 U.S. at 345; conversely, the danger of forum-shopping
may not pose a significant risk here because traditional venue doctrine would
insure that these next-friend suits are brought in the district of residence of
the habeas movant, see Henderson, 157 F.3d at 127. See also Armentero,
340 F.3d at 1069-70.
33The
party seeking the transfer must clearly specify the essential witnesses to be
called and must make a general statement of what their testimony will cover. In
determining the convenience of the witnesses, the Court must examine the
materiality and importance of the anticipated witnesses’ testimony and then
determine their accessibility and convenience to the forum. See 15
CHARLES A.
WRIGHT,
ET AL., FED. PRACTICE & PROCEDURE § 3851(West 2003).
1
Two of our sister circuits have reached the identical conclusion. See Al Odah v.
United States, 321 F.3d 1134, 1143 (D.C. Cir. 2003), cert. granted, 72 U.S.L.W.
3323 (U.S. Nov. 10, 2003) (No. 03-334) ("Rasul"), and 72 U.S.L.W. 3327
(U.S. Nov. 10, 2003) (No. 03-343) ("Al Odah") (consolidated); Cuban
Am. Bar Ass’n v. Christopher, 43 F.3d 1412, 1425 (11th Cir. 1995).
2
In addition to the Guantanamo Lease, other agreements between the United States
and Cuba are relevant. The two governments agreed on July 2, 1903, to the
so-called "Parallel Treaty," which "conclude[d] the conditions of
the lease" signed in February 1903. Lease of Certain Areas for Naval or
Coaling Stations, July 2, 1903, T.S. No. 426 ("Parallel Treaty"),
pmbl. The Parallel Treaty also set additional terms (such as the amount of
annual rent) affecting the Guantanamo Lease.
Additionally,
the 1934 U.S.-Cuba Treaty maintained that the "supplementary agreement in
regard to naval or coaling stations signed between the two Governments on July
2, 1903, also shall continue in effect in the same form and on the same
conditions with respect to the naval station at Guantanamo." Treaty Between
the United States of America and Cuba Defining Their Relations, May 29, 1934,
U.S.–Cuba, art. III, 48 Stat. 1682, 1683.
3
Under Article 31.1 of the Vienna Convention, "[a] treaty shall be
interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to
the terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of its object and
purpose." Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969,
art. 31.1, 1155 U.N.T.S.
331
(Jan. 27, 1980) (emphasis added). Although the United States is not a signatory
to the Vienna Convention, it is the policy of the United States to apply
Articles 31 and 32 as customary international law.
Gonzalez v. Gutierrez,
311 F.3d 942, 949 n.15 (9th Cir. 2002).
To
the extent that the Lease is better seen as a contract, similar rules require us
to give each word meaning. See Cree v. Waterbury, 78 F.3d 1400, 1405 (9th Cir.
1996) (explaining the rule of contract construction that "a court must give
effect to every word or term employed by the parties and reject none as
meaningless or surplusage in arriving at the intention of the contracting
parties" (internal quotation marks omitted)).
4
Sovereignty is not always an all-or-nothing concept. "Partial
sovereignty" and the concurrent existence of "joint sovereigns"
are well-established concepts in American law. For example, this concept of
less-than-complete sovereignty is at the heart of our federal system: the States
are "sovereign" but subject to requirements imposed by the Federal
Constitution. Thus, the Supreme Court has explained the purpose of the Eleventh
Amendment as being "rooted in a recognition that the States, although a
union, maintain certain attributes of sovereignty, including sovereign
immunity." P.R. Aqueduct & Sewer Auth. v. Metcalf & Eddy, Inc., 506
U.S. 139, 146 (1993); see also Fed. Mar. Comm’n v. S.C. State Ports Auth., 535
U.S. 743, 765 (2002) (explaining that the central purpose of the sovereign
immunity doctrine is to "accord the States the respect owed them as joint
sovereigns" (internal quotation marks omitted)). Thus, in theory, Cuba
could have ceded some, but not all, of its sovereignty over Guantanamo to the
United States.
5
Guantanamo Lease, art. II ("The grant . . . shall include the right . . .
to do any and all things necessary to fit the premises for use as coaling or
naval stations only, and for no other purpose." (emphasis added)).
6
Parallel Treaty, art. I ("The United States of America agrees and covenants
to pay to the Republic of Cuba the annual sum of two thousand dollars, in cold
coin of the United States, as long as the former shall occupy and use said areas
of land by virtue of said agreement.").
7
Guantanamo Lease, art. II.
8
Although the United States may have violated the Lease in a number of ways,
holding prisoners at Guantanamo does not appear to be one of them. Under the
Lease, the United States is entitled to maintain a Navy base at Guantanamo.
Navy
bases commonly contain brigs to hold prisoners. See, e.g., The Brig: A Two
Hundred Year Tradition, at http://www.brigpuget.navy.mil/history.htm (last
visited Dec. 11, 2003). Using the Guantanamo brig to hold prisoners thus seems
at first blush not to violate the Lease’s provisions.
9
The Government of Cuba apparently adheres to my view on this point. See
Maj. op. at 35 n.19.
10
For the same reason, I would not reach the issue of venue.
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